tl;dr: If you are a Debian user who knows git, don t work with Debian source packages. Don t use apt source, or dpkg-source. Instead, use dgit and work in git. Also, don t use: VCS links on official Debian web pages, debcheckout, or Debian s (semi-)official gitlab, Salsa. These are suitable for Debian experts only; for most people they can be beartraps. Instead, use dgit.

• Struggling with Debian source packages?
• Just use dgit
• Objections
  • But I don t want to learn yet another tool
  • Shouldn t I be using official Debian git repos?
  • Gosh, is Debian really this bad?
  • I m a Debian maintainer. You tell me dgit is something totally different!

> Struggling with Debian source packages? A friend of mine recently asked for help on IRC. They re an experienced Debian administrator and user, and were trying to: make a change to a Debian package; build and install and run binary packages from it; and record that change for their future self, and their colleagues. They ended up trying to comprehend quilt. quilt is an ancient utility for managing sets of source code patches, from well before the era of modern version control. It has many strange behaviours and footguns. Debian s ancient and obsolete tarballs-and-patches source package format (which I designed the initial version of in 1993) nowadays uses quilt, at least for most packages. You don t want to deal with any of this nonsense. You don t want to learn quilt, and suffer its misbehaviours. You don t want to learn about Debian source packages and wrestle dpkg-source. Happily, you don t need to. Just use dgit One of dgit s main objectives is to minimise the amount of Debian craziness you need to learn. dgit aims to empower you to make changes to the software you re running, conveniently and with a minimum of fuss. You can use dgit to get the source code to a Debian package, as a git tree, with dgit clone (and dgit fetch). The git tree can be made into a binary package directly. The only things you really need to know are:

1. By default dgit fetches from Debian unstable, the main work-in-progress branch. You may want something like dgit clone PACKAGE bookworm,-security (yes, with a comma).
2. You probably want to edit debian/changelog to make your packages have a different version number.
3. To build binaries, run dpkg-buildpackage -uc -b.
4. Debian package builds are often disastrously messsy: builds might modify source files; and the official debian/rules clean can be inadequate, or crazy. Always commit before building, and use git clean and git reset --hard instead of running clean rules from the package.

Don t try to make a Debian source package. (Don t read the dpkg-source manual!) Instead, to preserve and share your work, use the git branch. dgit pull or dgit fetch can be used to get updates. There is a more comprehensive tutorial, with example runes, in the dgit-user(7) manpage. (There is of course complete reference documentation, but you don t need to bother reading it.) Objections But I don t want to learn yet another tool One of dgit s main goals is to save people from learning things you don t need to. It aims to be straightforward, convenient, and (so far as Debian permits) unsurprising. So: don t learn dgit. Just run it and it will be fine :-). Shouldn t I be using official Debian git repos? Absolutely not. Unless you are a Debian expert, these can be terrible beartraps. One possible outcome is that you might build an apparently working program but without the security patches. Yikes! I discussed this in more detail in 2021 in another blog post plugging dgit. Gosh, is Debian really this bad? Yes. On behalf of the Debian Project, I apologise. Debian is a very conservative institution. Change usually comes very slowly. (And when rapid or radical change has been forced through, the results haven t always been pretty, either technically or socially.) Sadly this means that sometimes much needed change can take a very long time, if it happens at all. But this tendency also provides the stability and reliability that people have come to rely on Debian for. I m a Debian maintainer. You tell me dgit is something totally different! dgit is, in fact, a general bidirectional gateway between the Debian archive and git. So yes, dgit is also a tool for Debian uploaders. You should use it to do your uploads, whenever you can. It s more convenient and more reliable than git-buildpackage and dput runes, and produces better output for users. You too can start to forget how to deal with source packages! A full treatment of this is beyond the scope of this blog post.

comments

• Discussed the ongoing difficulties in supporting the Debian "marvell" kernel flavour. Reviewed the related merge request to fix armel build regression in Debian 12 "bookworm".
• Wrote and recorded a talk for DebConf on What's new in the Linux kernel. Apologies for the poor audio quality; I will use a different microphone if I do this again.
• Reviewed Bastian Blank's proposed changes to kernel package versioning and signing in Debian.
• Reported several bad backports to some Linux stable branches.
• Proposed a build fix for linux 6.5 on s390x.
• Updated the linux package for Debian 10 "buster" to 4.19.295, but didn't make an upload.

Focus This month I didn't have any particular focus. I just worked on issues in my info bubble.

Changes

• tracer: mention needrestart
• duck: add inactive project indicator
• Debian wiki pages: AutoGeneratedFiles, CopyrightReviewTools, CornerCase, CrossGrading, DeveloperNews, Hardware/Wanted, InstallingDebianOn/SiFive/HiFiveUnmatched
• FOSSjobs wiki pages: Resources
• vcs-home wiki: add more dotfile repos/tools

Issues

• Files in wrong dir in git-cola
• Conffile removal needed in dkms
• New SWH listers needed for HGKeeper, Smithy, humungus, git-arr, gitile, gotweb, ABF, Bonobo Git Server, darcsden

Review

• Debian packages: sponsored purple-discord x2
• Debian wiki: RecentChanges for the month
• Debian BTS usertags: changes for the month
• Debian screenshots:
  • approved c-evo-dh-gtk2 fim fish foliate mpc123 nfoview qpwgraph scite viewnior
  • rejected hw-probe (photos), wine64 (desktop logo), phasex (artwork), qpwgraph (about dialog), fim/fish (help output), python-lunch (full desktop), ruby-full (website), ausweisapp2 (PII), pngtools (movie poster), x11vnc (web page,) mount (systemd), blastem (photo), ca-certificates (tiny, Windows)

Administration

• Debian servers: extract user data from recent wiki backups
• Debian wiki: fix broken user account, approve accounts

Communication

• Respond to queries from Debian users and contributors on the mailing lists and IRC.

Sponsors The SWH work was sponsored. All other work was done on a volunteer basis.

Contributing to Debian is part of Freexian s mission. This article covers the latest achievements of Freexian and their collaborators. All of this is made possible by organizations subscribing to our Long Term Support contracts and consulting services.

urllib3 s old security patch by Stefano Rivera Stefano ran into a test-suite failure in a new Debian package (python-truststore), caused by Debian s patch to urllib3 from a decade ago, making it enable TLS verification by default (remember those days!). Some analysis confirmed that this patch isn t useful any more, and could be removed. While working on the package, Stefano investigated the scope of the urllib3 2.x transition. It looks ready to start, not many packages are affected.

Preparing for Python 3.12 in dh-python by Stefano Rivera We are preparing to start the Python 3.12 transition in Debian. Two of the upstream changes that are going to cause a lot of packages to break could be worked-around in dh-python, so we did:

• Distutils is no longer shipped in the Python stdlib. Packages need to Build-Depend on python3-setuptools to get a (compatibility shim) distutils. Until that happens, dh-python will Depend on setuptools.
• A failure to find any tests to execute will now make the unittest runner exit 5, like pytest does. This was our change, to test-suites that have failed to be automatically discovered. It will cause many packages to fail to build, so until they explicitly skip running test suites, dh-python will ignore these failures.

/usr-merge by Helmut Grohne It has become clear that the planned changes to debhelper and systemd.pc cause more rc-bugs. Helmut researched these systematically and filed another stack of patches. At the time of this writing, the uploads would still cause about 40 rc-bugs. A new opt-in helper dh_movetousr has been developed and added to debhelper in trixie and unstable.

debian-printing, by Thorsten Alteholz This month Thorsten adopted two packages, namely rlpr and lprng, and moved them to the debian-printing team. As part of this Thorsten could close eight bugs in the BTS. Thorsten also uploaded a new upstream version of cups, which also meant that eleven bugs could be closed. As package hannah-foo2zjs still depended on the deprecated policykit-1 package, Thorsten changed the dependency list accordingly and could close one RC bug by the following upload.

Invalid PEP-440 Versions in Python Packages by Stefano Rivera Stefano investigated how many packages in Debian (typically Debian-native packages) recorded versions in their packaging metadata (egg-info directories) that weren t valid PEP-440 Python versions. pip is starting to enforce that all versions on the system are valid.

Miscellaneous contributions

• distro-info-data updates in Debian, due to the new Ubuntu release, by Stefano.
• DebConf 23 bookkeeping continues, but is winding down. Stefano still spends a little time on it.
• Utkarsh continues to monitor and help with reimbursements.
• Helmut continues to maintain architecture bootstrap and accidentally broke pam briefly
• Anton uploaded boost1.83 and started to prepare a transition to make boost1.83 as a default boost version.
• Rejuntada Debian UY 2023, a MiniDebConf that will be held in Montevideo, from 9 to 11 November, mainly organized by Santiago.

I haven't done one of these in a while! Denver Luna is the latest single from Underworld, here on a pink 12" vinyl. The notable thing about this release was it was preceded by an "acapella" mix, consisting of just Karl Hyde's vocals: albeit treated and layered. Personally I prefer the "main" single mix, which calls back to their biggest hits. The vinyl also features an instrumental take, which is currently unavailable in any other formats. The previous single (presumably both from a forthcoming album) was and the colour red. In this crazy world we live in, this was limited to 1,000 copies. Flippers have sold 4 on eBay already, at between 55 and 75.

Today, 12 years after the meeting where AppStream was first discussed and 11 years after I released a prototype implementation I am excited to announce AppStream 1.0! Check it out on GitHub, or get the release tarball or read the documentation or release notes!

Some nostalgic memories I was not in the original AppStream meeting, since in 2011 I was extremely busy with finals preparations and ball organization in high school, but I still vividly remember sitting at school in the students lounge during a break and trying to catch the really choppy live stream from the meeting on my borrowed laptop (a futile exercise, I watched parts of the blurry recording later). I was extremely passionate about getting software deployment to work better on Linux and to improve the overall user experience, and spent many hours on the PackageKit IRC channel discussing things with many amazing people like Richard Hughes, Daniel Nicoletti, Sebastian Heinlein and others. At the time I was writing a software deployment tool called Listaller this was before Linux containers were a thing, and building it was very tough due to technical and personal limitations (I had just learned C!). Then in university, when I intended to recreate this tool, but for real and better this time as a new project called Limba, I needed a way to provide metadata for it, and AppStream fit right in! Meanwhile, Richard Hughes was tackling the UI side of things while creating GNOME Software and needed a solution as well. So I implemented a prototype and together we pretty much reshaped the early specification from the original meeting into what would become modern AppStream. Back then I saw AppStream as a necessary side-project for my actual project, and didn t even consider me as the maintainer of it for quite a while (I hadn t been at the meeting afterall). All those years ago I had no idea that ultimately I was developing AppStream not for Limba, but for a new thing that would show up later, with an even more modern design called Flatpak. I also had no idea how incredibly complex AppStream would become and how many features it would have and how much more maintenance work it would be and also not how ubiquitous it would become. The modern Linux desktop uses AppStream everywhere now, it is supported by all major distributions, used by Flatpak for metadata, used for firmware metadata via Richard s fwupd/LVFS, runs on every Steam Deck, can be found in cars and possibly many places I do not know yet.

What is new in 1.0?

API breaks The most important thing that s new with the 1.0 release is a bunch of incompatible changes. For the shared libraries, all deprecated API elements have been removed and a bunch of other changes have been made to improve the overall API and especially make it more binding-friendly. That doesn t mean that the API is completely new and nothing looks like before though, when possible the previous API design was kept and some changes that would have been too disruptive have not been made. Regardless of that, you will have to port your AppStream-using applications. For some larger ones I already submitted patches to build with both AppStream versions, the 0.16.x stable series as well as 1.0+. For the XML specification, some older compatibility for XML that had no or very few users has been removed as well. This affects for example release elements that reference downloadable data without an artifact block, which has not been supported for a while. For all of these, I checked to remove only things that had close to no users and that were a significant maintenance burden. So as a rule of thumb: If your XML validated with no warnings with the 0.16.x branch of AppStream, it will still be 100% valid with the 1.0 release. Another notable change is that the generated output of AppStream 1.0 will always be 1.0 compliant, you can not make it generate data for versions below that (this greatly reduced the maintenance cost of the project).

Developer element For a long time, you could set the developer name using the top-level developer_name tag. With AppStream 1.0, this is changed a bit. There is now a developer tag with a name child (that can be translated unless the translate="no" attribute is set on it). This allows future extensibility, and also allows to set a machine-readable id attribute in the developer element. This permits software centers to group software by developer easier, without having to use heuristics. If we decide to extend the developer information per-app in future, this is also now possible. Do not worry though the developer_name tag is also still read, so there is no high pressure to update. The old 0.16.x stable series also has this feature backported, so it can be available everywhere. Check out the developer tag specification for more details.

Scale factor for screenshots Screenshot images can now have a scale attribute, to indicate an (integer) scaling factor to apply. This feature was a breaking change and therefore we could not have it for the longest time, but it is now available. Please wait a bit for AppStream 1.0 to become deployed more widespread though, as using it with older AppStream versions may lead to issues in some cases. Check out the screenshots tag specification for more details.

Screenshot environments It is now possible to indicate the environment a screenshot was recorded in (GNOME, GNOME Dark, KDE Plasma, Windows, etc.) via an environment attribute on the respective screenshot tag. This was also a breaking change, so use it carefully for now! If projects want to, they can use this feature to supply dedicated screenshots depending on the environment the application page is displayed in. Check out the screenshots tag specification for more details.

References tag This is a feature more important for the scientific community and scientific applications. Using the references tag, you can associate the AppStream component with a DOI (Digital object identifier) or provide a link to a CFF file to provide citation information. It also allows to link to other scientific registries. Check out the references tag specification for more details.

Release tags Releases can have tags now, just like components. This is generally not a feature that I expect to be used much, but in certain instances it can become useful with a cooperating software center, for example to tag certain releases as long-term supported versions.

Multi-platform support Thanks to the interest and work of many volunteers, AppStream (mostly) runs on FreeBSD now, a NetBSD port exists, support for macOS was written and a Windows port is on its way! Thank you to everyone working on this

Better compatibility checks For a long time I thought that the AppStream library should just be a thin layer above the XML and that software centers should just implement a lot of the actual logic. This has not been the case for a while, but there was still a lot of complex AppStream features that were hard for software centers to implement and where it makes sense to have one implementation that projects can just use. The validation of component relations is one such thing. This was implemented in 0.16.x as well, but 1.0 vastly improves upon the compatibility checks, so you can now just run as_component_check_relations and retrieve a detailed list of whether the current component will run well on the system. Besides better API for software developers, the appstreamcli utility also has much improved support for relation checks, and I wrote about these changes in a previous post. Check it out! With these changes, I hope this feature will be used much more, and beyond just drivers and firmware.

So much more! The changelog for the 1.0 release is huge, and there are many papercuts resolved and changes made that I did not talk about here, like us using gi-docgen (instead of gtkdoc) now for nice API documentation, or the many improvements that went into better binding support, or better search, or just plain bugfixes.

Outlook I expect the transition to 1.0 to take a bit of time. AppStream has not broken its API for many, many years (since 2016), so a bunch of places need to be touched even if the changes themselves are minor in many cases. In hindsight, I should have also released 1.0 much sooner and it should not have become such a mega-release, but that was mainly due to time constraints. So, what s in it for the future? Contrary to what I thought, AppStream does not really seem to be done and fetature complete at a point, there is always something to improve, and people come up with new usecases all the time. So, expect more of the same in future: Bugfixes, validator improvements, documentation improvements, better tools and the occasional new feature. Onwards to 1.0.1!

Armadillo is a powerful and expressive C++ template library for linear algebra and scientific computing. It aims towards a good balance between speed and ease of use, has a syntax deliberately close to Matlab, and is useful for algorithm development directly in C++, or quick conversion of research code into production environments. RcppArmadillo integrates this library with the R environment and language and is widely used by (currently) 1110 other packages on CRAN, downloaded 31.2 million times (per the partial logs from the cloud mirrors of CRAN), and the CSDA paper (preprint / vignette) by Conrad and myself has been cited 563 times according to Google Scholar. This release brings upstream bugfix releases 12.6.5 (sparse matrix corner case) and 12.6.6 with an ARPACK correction. Conrad released it this this morning, I had been running reverse dependency checks anyway and knew we were in good shape so for once I did not await a full run against the now over 1100 (!!) packages using RcppArmadillo. This release also contains a change I prepared on Sunday and which helps with much-criticized (and rightly I may add) insistence by CRAN concerning throttling . The motivation is understandable: CRAN tests many packages at once on beefy servers and can ill afford tests going off and requesting numerous cores. But rather than providing a global setting at their end, CRAN insists that each package (!!) deals with this. The recent traffic on the helpful-as-ever r-pkg-devel mailing clearly shows that this confuses quite a few package developers. Some have admitted to simply turning examples and tests off: a net loss for all of us. Now, Armadillo defaults to using up to eight cores (which is enough to upset CRAN) when running with OpenMP (which is generally only on Linux for reasons I rather not get into ). With this release I expose a helper functions (from OpenMP) to limit this. I also set up an example package and repo RcppArmadilloOpenMPEx detailing this, and added a demonstration of how to use the new throttlers to the fastLm example. I hope this proves useful to users of the package. The set of changes since the last CRAN release follows.

Changes in RcppArmadillo version 0.12.6.6.0 (2023-10-31)

• Upgraded to Armadillo release 12.6.6 (Cortisol Retox)
  • Fix eigs_sym(), eigs_gen() and svds() to generate deterministic results in ARPACK mode
• Add helper functions to set and get the number of OpenMP threads
• Store initial thread count at package load and use in thread-throttling helper (and resetter) suitable for CRAN constraints

Changes in RcppArmadillo version 0.12.6.5.0 (2023-10-14)

• Upgraded to Armadillo release 12.6.5 (Cortisol Retox)
  • Fix for corner-case bug in handling sparse matrices with no non-zero elements

Courtesy of my CRANberries, there is a diffstat report relative to previous release. More detailed information is on the RcppArmadillo page. Questions, comments etc should go to the rcpp-devel mailing list off the Rcpp R-Forge page. If you like this or other open-source work I do, you can sponsor me at GitHub.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. Please report excessive re-aggregation in third-party for-profit settings.

Due to the current state of affairs in Israel, who were to host DebConf24, the DebConf committee has decided to renew calls for bids to host DebConf24 at another venue and location. The DebConf committee would like to express our sincere appreciation for the DebConf Israeli team, and the work they've done over several years. However, given the uncertainty about the situation, we regret that it will most likely not be possible to hold DebConf in Israel. As we ask for submissions for new host locations we ask that you please review and understand the details and requirements for a bid submission to host the Debian Developer Conference. Please review the template for a DebConf bid for guidelines on how to sumbit a proper bid. To submit a bid, please create the appropriate page(s) under DebConf Wiki Bids, and add it to the "Bids" section in the main DebConf 24 page. There isn't very much time to make a decision. We need bids by the end of November in order to make a decision by the end of the year. After your submission is completed please send us a notification at debconf-team@lists.debian.org to let us know that your bid submission is ready for review. We also suggest hanging out in our IRC chat room #debconf-team. Given this short deadline, we understand that bids won't be as complete as they would usually be. Do the best you can in the time available. Bids will be evaluated according to The Priority List. You can get in contact with the DebConf team by email to debconf-team@lists.debian.org, or via the #debconf-team IRC channel on OFTC or via our Matrix Channel. Thank you, The Debian Debconf Committee

I stick to some very archaic workflows, e.g. to connect to some corp VPN I just run sudo vpnc-connect and later on sudo vpnc-disconnect. In the past that also managed to restore my resolv.conf, currently it doesn't. According to a colleague that's also the case for Ubuntu. Taking a step back, the sane way would be to use the NetworkManager vpnc plugin, but that does not work with this specific case because we use uncool VPN tech which requires the Enable weak authentication setting for vpnc. There is a feature request open for that one at https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/NetworkManager-vpnc/-/issues/11 Taking another step back I thought that it shouldn't be that hard to add some checkbox, a boolean and render out another config flag or line in a config file. Not as intuitive as I thought this mix of XML and C. So let's quickly look elsewhere. What happens is that the backup files in /var/run/vpnc/ are created by the vpnc-scripts script called vpnc-script, but not moved back, because it adds some pid as a suffix and the pid is not the final pid of the vpnc process. Basically it can not find the backup when it tries to restore it. So I decided to replace the pid guessing code with a suffix made up of the gateway IP and the tun interface name. No idea if that is stable in all circumstance (someone with a vpn name DNS RR?) or several connections to different gateways. But good enough for myself, so here is my patch:

vpnc-scripts [master]$ cat debian/patches/replace-pid-detection 
Index: vpnc-scripts/vpnc-script
===================================================================
--- vpnc-scripts.orig/vpnc-script
+++ vpnc-scripts/vpnc-script
@@ -91,21 +91,15 @@ OS=" uname -s "
 HOOKS_DIR=/etc/vpnc
-# Use the PID of the controlling process (vpnc or OpenConnect) to
-# uniquely identify this VPN connection. Normally, the parent process
-# is a shell, and the grandparent's PID is the relevant one.
-# OpenConnect v9.0+ provides VPNPID, so we don't need to determine it.
-if [ -z "$VPNPID" ]; then
-    VPNPID=$PPID
-    PCMD= ps -c -o cmd= -p $PPID 
-    case "$PCMD" in
-        *sh) VPNPID= ps -o ppid= -p $PPID  ;;
-    esac
+# This whole script is called twice via vpnc-connect. On the first run
+# the variables are empty. Catch that and move on when they're there.
+if [ -n "$VPNGATEWAY" ]; then
+    BACKUPID="$ VPNGATEWAY _$ TUNDEV "
+    DEFAULT_ROUTE_FILE=/var/run/vpnc/defaultroute.$ BACKUPID 
+    DEFAULT_ROUTE_FILE_IPV6=/var/run/vpnc/defaultroute_ipv6.$ BACKUPID 
+    RESOLV_CONF_BACKUP=/var/run/vpnc/resolv.conf-backup.$ BACKUPID 
 fi
-DEFAULT_ROUTE_FILE=/var/run/vpnc/defaultroute.$ VPNPID 
-DEFAULT_ROUTE_FILE_IPV6=/var/run/vpnc/defaultroute_ipv6.$ VPNPID 
-RESOLV_CONF_BACKUP=/var/run/vpnc/resolv.conf-backup.$ VPNPID 
 SCRIPTNAME= basename $0 
 # some systems, eg. Darwin & FreeBSD, prune /var/run on boot

Or rolled into a debian package at https://sven.stormbind.net/debian/vpnc-scripts/ The colleague decided to stick to NetworkManager, moved the vpnc binary aside and added a wrapper which invokes vpnc with --enable-weak-authentication. The beauty is, all of this will break on updates, so at some point someone has to understand GTK4 to fix the NetworkManager plugin for good.

Review: A Killing Frost, by Seanan McGuire

Series:	October Daye #14
Publisher:	DAW
Copyright:	2020
ISBN:	0-7564-1253-6
Format:	Kindle
Pages:	351

A Killing Frost is the 14th book in the October Daye urban fantasy series and a direct plot sequel to the events of The Brightest Fell. You definitely cannot start here. This review has some relationship spoilers here for things that you would be expecting after the first five or six books, but which you wouldn't know when reading the first few books of the series. If you haven't started the series yet but plan to, consider skipping this review; if you haven't started reading this series, it will probably be meaningless anyway. Finally, events seem to have slowed, enough trauma has been healed, and Toby is able to seriously consider getting married. However, no sooner is the thought voiced than fae politics injects itself yet again. In order to get married without creating potentially substantial future problems for herself and her family, Toby will have to tie up some loose ends. Since one of those loose ends is a price from the Luidaeg that has been haunting her family for decades, this is easier said than done. The Brightest Fell had a very unsatisfying ending. This, after a two book interlude, is the proper end to that story. I picked this up when I had a bunch of stressful things going on and I wanted to be entertained without having to do much work as a reader. Once again, this series delivered exactly that. The writing is repetitive and a bit clunky, McGuire hammers the same emotional points into the ground, and one does wonder about Toby's tendency to emulate a half-human battering ram, but every book has me engrossed and turning the pages. Everyone should have at least one book series on the go that offers reliable, low-effort entertainment. The initial lever that McGuire uses to push Toby into this plot (fae marriage requirements that had never previously been mentioned) felt rather strained and arbitrary, and I spent the first part of the book grumbling a bit about it. However, there is a better reason for this complication that is revealed with time, and which implies some interesting things about how the fae see heroes and how they use them to solve problems. Now I'm wondering if McGuire will explore that some more in later books. This is the "all is revealed" book about Simon Torquill. As we get later into the series, these "all is revealed" books are coming more frequently. So far, I'm finding the revelations satisfying, which is a lot harder than it looks with a series this long and with this many hidden details. There are a few directions the series is taking that aren't my favorite (the Daoine Sidhe obsession with being the Best Fae is getting a bit boring, for example), but none of them seem egregiously off, and I'm deeply invested in the answers to the remaining questions. Toby hits a personal record here for not explaining the dangerous things she's doing because people might talk her out of it. It makes for a tense and gripping climax, but wow I felt for her friends and family, and substantial parts of that risk seemed unnecessary. This is pointed out to her in no uncertain terms, and I'm wondering if it will finally stick. Toby's tendency to solve complicated problems by bleeding on them is part of what gives this series its charm, but I wouldn't mind her giving other people more of a chance to come up with better plans. I did not like this one as well as the previous two books, mostly because I prefer the Luidaeg-centric stories to the Daoine-Sidhe-centric stories, but if you're enjoying the series to this point, this won't be an exception. It's a substantial improvement on The Brightest Fell and did a lot to salvage that story for me, although there are still some aspects of it that need better explanations. Followed by When Sorrows Come. As usual, there is a novella included in at least the Kindle edition. "Shine in Pearl": I was again hoping for more Gillian, but alas. Instead, and breaking with the tendency for the novellas to be side stories unrelated to the main novel, this fleshes out Simon's past and the other primary relationship driving the novel's plot. It's... fine? The best parts by far are the scenes from Dianda's viewpoint, which are just as refreshingly blunt as Dianda is elsewhere. Neither of the other two characters are favorites of mine, and since the point of the story is to describe the tragedy that is resolved in the plot of the main novel, it's somewhat depressing. Not my favorite of the novellas; not the worst of them. (6) Rating: 7 out of 10

My previously mentioned C.H.I.P. repurposing has been partly successful; I ve found a use for it (which I still need to write up), but unfortunately it s too useful and the fact it s still a bit flaky has become a problem. I spent a while trying to isolate exactly what the problem is (I m still seeing occasional hard hangs with no obvious debug output in the logs or on the serial console), then realised I should just buy one of the cheap ARM SBC boards currently available. The C.H.I.P. is based on an Allwinner R8, which is a single ARM v7 core (an A8). So it s fairly low power by today s standards and it seemed pretty much any board would probably do. I considered a Pi 2 Zero, but couldn t be bothered trying to find one in stock at a reasonable price (I ve had one on backorder from CPC since May 2022, and yes, I know other places have had them in stock since but I don t need one enough to chase and I m now mostly curious about whether it will ever ship). As the title of this post gives away, I settled on a Banana Pi BPI-M2 Zero, which is based on an Allwinner H3. That s a quad-core ARM v7 (an A7), so a bit more oompfh than the C.H.I.P. All in all it set me back 25, including a set of heatsinks that form a case around it. I started with the vendor provided Debian SD card image, which is based on Debian 9 (stretch) and so somewhat old. I was able to dist-upgrade my way through buster and bullseye, and end up on bookworm. I then discovered the bookworm 6.1 kernel worked just fine out of the box, and even included a suitable DTB. Which got me thinking about whether I could do a completely fresh Debian install with minimal tweaking. First thing, a boot loader. The Allwinner chips are nice in that they ll boot off SD, so I just needed a suitable u-boot image. Rather than go with the vendor image I had a look at mainline and discovered it had support! So let s build a clean image: I had the advantage here of already having a host setup to cross build armhf binaries, but this was all done on a Debian bookworm host with packages from main. I ve put my build up here in case it s useful to someone - everything else below can be done on a normal x86_64 host. Next I needed a Debian installer. I went for the netboot variant - although I was writing it to SD rather than TFTP booting I wanted as much as possible to come over the network. Then I took a suitable microSD card and set it up with a 500M primary VFAT partition, leaving the rest for Linux proper. I could have got away with a smaller VFAT partition but I d initially thought I might need to put some more installation files on it. The bootloader image gets written 8k into the SD card (our first partition starts at sector 2048, i.e. 1M into the device, so there s plenty of space here): Copy the Debian installer files onto the VFAT partition: Unmount the SD from the build host, pop it into the M2 Zero, boot it up while connected to the serial console, hit a key to stop autoboot and tell it to boot the installer: At this point the installer runs and you can do a normal install. Well, except the wifi wasn t detected, I think because the netinst images don t include firmware. I spent a bit of time trying to figure out how to include it but ultimately ended up installing over a USB ethernet dongle, which Just Worked and was less faff. Installing firmware-brcm80211 once installation completed allowed the built-in wifi to work fine. After install you need to configure u-boot to boot without intervention. At the u-boot prompt (i.e. after hitting a key to stop autoboot): This is assuming you have /boot on partition 2 on the SD - I left the first partition as VFAT (that s where the u-boot environment will be saved) and just used all of the rest as a single ext4 partition. I did have to do an e2label /dev/sdb2 BPI-ROOT to label / appropriately; otherwise I occasionally saw the SD card appear as mmc1 for Linux (I m guessing due to asynchronous boot order with the wifi). You should now find the device boots without intervention.

I have just got a PineTime smart watch [1] from Pine64. They cost $US27 each which ended up as $144.63 Australian for three including postage when I ordered on the 16th of September, it s annoying that you can t order more than 3 at a time to reduce postage costs. The Australian online store Kogan has smart watches starting at about $15 [2] with Bluetooth and support for phone notifications so the $48.21 for a PineTime doesn t compare well on just price and features. The watches Kogan sells start getting into high resolution at around the $25 price and many of them have features like 24*7 heart monitoring that the PineTime lacks (it just measures when you request it). No-one would order a PineTime for being cheap or having lots of features, you order it because you want open hardware that allows you to do things your way. Also the PineTime isn t going to be orphaned while it s likely that in a few years most of the cheap watches sold by Kogan etc won t support the new phones running the latest version of Android. The screen of the PineTime is 240*240 resolution (about 260dpi) with 64k colors. The screen resolution is lower than some high-end smart watches but higher than most phones and almost all monitors. I doubt that much benefit could be gained from higher resolution. Even on minimum brightness the screen is easy to read on all but the brightest sunny days. The compute capabilities are 4.5MB of flash storage, 64k of RAM, and a 64MHz CPU this can t run Linux and nothing like it will run Linux for a long time. I ve had the PineTime for 6 days now, I charged it once and it s now at 55% battery. It looks like it will last close to 2 weeks on a single charge and it s claimed that a newer firmware will make the battery last longer. Software The main Android app for using with the PineTime is GadgetBridge which I installed from the f-droid repository. It had lots of click-through menus for allowing access to various Android features (contacts, bluetooth, draw over foreground, location, and more) but after that it was easy to setup. It was the first bluetooth device I ve used which had a 6 digit PIN for connecting to a phone. Initially I used the PineTime with my Huawei Nova 7i [3]. The aim is to eventually have it run from my PinePhonePro but my test of the PinePhonePro didn t go as well as hoped [4]. Now I m using it on my Huawei Mate 10 Pro. It comes with InfiniTime [5] installed as the default firmware, mine had 1.11.0 which is a fairly recent version. I will probably upgrade it soon to get the better power optimisation and weather alerts in the watch face. I don t have any plans to use different watch firmware and I don t have any plans to contribute to firmware development I just can t hack on every FOSS project around it s better to do big contributions to a small number of projects. For people who don t want the default firmware the Wasp-OS project seems interesting as it s written in Python [6], I don t like Python but it s very popular. Python is particularly popular in ML development, it will be interesting to see if Wasp-OS becomes a preferred platform for smart watches that talk to GPT servers. Generally the software works well, one annoyance is that when a notification goes away on the phone it remains on the PineTime and has to be manually dismissed. It would be nice if clearing notifications on the phone would clear them on the PineTime too. The music control works with RocketPlayer on Android, it displays the track name and has options for pause/play and skipping forward and backward one track. Annoyingly the current firmware doesn t allow configuring the main screens, from the primary screen you swipe down for notifications, right for settings, up for menus, and there s nothing defined for swipe left. I d like to make swipe left the command to get to music control. Hardware It has a detachable band that appears to be within the common range of watch bands. According to the PineTime Wiki page [7] there are a selection of alternate bands that will fit it, but some don t because the band is recessed into the watch. It is IP67 rated which means you can probably wear it while swimming. The charging contacts are exposed on the bottom of the case which means that any chemicals left by pool water can be cleaned off and also as they are apparently not expected to be harmed by sweat and skin oil there shouldn t be a problem charging it. I have significant experience using a Samsung Galaxy S5 Mini which is rated at IP67 in swimming pools. I had two problems with the S5 Mini when getting out of the pool, firstly water in the headphone socket made the phone consider that it was in headphone mode and turn off the speakers and secondly it took hours to become dry enough to charge and after many swims the charge rate dropped presumably due to oxide on the contacts. There are reports of success when swimming with a PineTime. Generally it feels well made and appears more solid than the cheapest Kogan devices appear to be. Conclusion If I wanted monitoring for medical reasons then I would choose a different smart watch. I ve read about people doing things like tracking their body stats 24*7 and trying to discover useful things, the PineTime is not a good option for BioHacking type use. However if I did have a need for such things I d probably just buy a second smart watch and have one on each wrist. The PineTime generally works well. It s a pity it has fewer hardware features than closed devices that are cheaper. But having a firmware that can be continually improved by the community is good. The continually expanding use of mobile phone technology devices for custom use in corporations (such as mobile phone in custom case for scanning prices etc in a supermarket) has some potential for use with this. I can imagine someone adding some custom features to a PineTime for such use. When a supermarket chain has 200,000 employees (as Woolworths in Australia does) then paying for a few months of software development work to make a smart watch do specific things for that company could provide significant value. There are probably some business opportunities for FOSS developers to hack on extra hardware on a PineTime and write software to support it. I recommend that everyone who s into FOSS buy one of these. Preferably make a deal with two friends to get the minimum postage cost.

• [1] https://pine64.com/product-category/pinetime-smartwatch/
• [2] https://www.kogan.com/au/shop/category/smart-watches/
• [3] https://etbe.coker.com.au/2022/04/20/android-without-play/
• [4] https://etbe.coker.com.au/2023/10/11/pinephone-status/
• [5] https://wiki.pine64.org/wiki/InfiniTime
• [6] https://wasp-os.readthedocs.io/en/latest/
• [7] https://wiki.pine64.org/wiki/PineTime

At the moment I am hard at work putting together the final bits for the AppStream 1.0 release (hopefully to be released this month). The new release comes with many new new features, an improved developer API and removal of most deprecated things (so it carefully breaks compatibility with very old data and the previous C API). One of the tasks for the upcoming 1.0 release was #481 asking about a formal way to distinguish Linux phone applications from desktop applications. AppStream infamously does not support any is-for-phone label for software components, instead the decision whether something is compatible with a device is based the the device s capabilities and the component s requirements. This allows for truly adaptive applications to describe their requirements correctly, and does not lock us into form factors going into the future, as there are many and the feature range between a phone, a tablet and a tiny laptop is quite fluid. Of course the match to current device capabilities check does not work if you are a website ranking phone compatibility. It also does not really work if you are a developer and want to know which devices your component / application will actually be considered compatible with. One goal for AppStream 1.0 is to have its library provide more complete building blocks to software centers. Instead of just a here s the data, interpret it according to the specification API, libappstream now interprets the specification for the application and provides API to handle most common operations like checking device compatibility. For developers, AppStream also now implements a few virtual chassis configurations , to roughly gauge which configurations a component may be compatible with. To test the new code, I ran it against the large Debian and Flatpak repositories to check which applications are considered compatible with what chassis/device type already. The result was fairly disastrous, with many applications not specifying compatibility correctly (many do, but it s by far not the norm!). Which brings me to the actual topic of this blog post: Very few seem to really know how to mark an application compatible with certain screen sizes and inputs! This is most certainly a matter of incomplete guides and good templates, so maybe this post can help with that a bit:

The ultimate cheat-sheet to mark your app chassis-type compatible As a quick reminder, compatibility is indicated using AppStream s relations system: A requires relation indicates that the system will not run at all or will run terribly if the requirement is not met. If the requirement is not met, it should not be installable on a system. A recommends relation means that it would be advantageous to have the recommended items, but it s not essential to run the application (it may run with a degraded experience without the recommended things though). And a supports relation means a given interface/device/control/etc. is supported by this application, but the application may work completely fine without it.

I have a desktop-only application A desktop-only application is characterized by needing a larger screen to fit the application, and requiring a physical keyboard and accurate mouse input. This type is assumed by default if no capabilities are set for an application, but it s better to be explicit. This is the metadata you need:

<component type="desktop-application">
  <id>org.example.desktopapp</id>
  <name>DesktopApp</name>
  [...]
  <requires>
    <display_length>768</display_length>
    <control>keyboard</control>
    <control>pointing</control>
  </requires>
  [...]
</component>

With this requires relation, you require a small-desktop sized screen (at least 768 device-independent pixels (dp) on its smallest edge) and require a keyboard and mouse to be present / connectable. Of course, if your application needs more minimum space, adjust the requirement accordingly. Note that if the requirement is not met, your application may not be offered for installation.

Note: Device-independent / logical pixels One logical pixel (= device independent pixel) roughly corresponds to the visual angle of one pixel on a device with a pixel density of 96 dpi (for historical X11 reasons) and a distance from the observer of about 52 cm, making the physical pixel about 0.26 mm in size. When using logical pixels as unit, they might not always map to exact physical lengths as their exact size is defined by the device providing the display. They do however accurately depict the maximum amount of pixels that can be drawn in the depicted direction on the device s display space. AppStream always uses logical pixels when measuring lengths in pixels.

I have an application that works on mobile and on desktop / an adaptive app Adaptive applications have fewer hard requirements, but a wide range of support for controls and screen sizes. For example, they support touch input, unlike desktop apps. An example MetaInfo snippet for these kind of apps may look like this:

<component type="desktop-application">
  <id>org.example.adaptive_app</id>
  <name>AdaptiveApp</name>
  [...]
  <requires>
    <display_length>360</display_length>
  </requires>
  <supports>
    <control>keyboard</control>
    <control>pointing</control>
    <control>touch</control>
  </supports>
  [...]
</component>

Unlike the pure desktop application, this adaptive application requires a much smaller lowest display edge length, and also supports touch input, in addition to keyboard and mouse/touchpad precision input.

I have a pure phone/table app Making an application a pure phone application is tricky: We need to mark it as compatible with phones only, while not completely preventing its installation on non-phone devices (even though its UI is horrible, you may want to test the app, and software centers may allow its installation when requested explicitly even if they don t show it by default). This is how to achieve that result:

<component type="desktop-application">
  <id>org.example.phoneapp</id>
  <name>PhoneApp</name>
  [...]
  <requires>
    <display_length>360</display_length>
  </requires>
  <recommends>
    <display_length compare="lt">1280</display_length>
    <control>touch</control>
  </recommends>
  [...]
</component>

We require a phone-sized display minimum edge size (adjust to a value that is fit for your app!), but then also recommend the screen to have a smaller edge size than a larger tablet/laptop, while also recommending touch input and not listing any support for keyboard and mouse. Please note that this blog post is of course not a comprehensive guide, so if you want to dive deeper into what you can do with requires/recommends/suggests/supports, you may want to have a look at the relations tags described in the AppStream specification.

Validation It is still easy to make mistakes with the system requirements metadata, which is why AppStream 1.0 will provide more commands to check MetaInfo files for system compatibility. Current pre-1.0 AppStream versions already have an is-satisfied command to check if the application is compatible with the currently running operating system:

:~$ appstreamcli is-satisfied ./org.example.adaptive_app.metainfo.xml
Relation check for: */*/*/org.example.adaptive_app/*
Requirements:
   Unable to check display size: Can not read information without GUI toolkit access.
Recommendations:
   No recommended items are set for this software.
Supported:
  Physical keyboard found.
  Pointing device (e.g. a mouse or touchpad) found.
   This software supports touch input.

In addition to this command, AppStream 1.0 will introduce a new one as well: check-syscompat. This command will check the component against libappstream s mock system configurations that define a most common (whatever that is at the time) configuration for a respective chassis type. If you pass the --details flag, you can even get an explanation why the component was considered or not considered for a specific chassis type:

:~$ appstreamcli check-syscompat --details ./org.example.phoneapp.metainfo.xml
Chassis compatibility check for: */*/*/org.example.phoneapp/*
Desktop:
   Incompatible
   recommends: This software recommends a display with its shortest edge
   being << 1280 px in size, but the display of this device has 1280 px.
   recommends: This software recommends a touch input device.
Laptop:
   Incompatible
   recommends: This software recommends a display with its shortest edge 
   being << 1280 px in size, but the display of this device has 1280 px.
   recommends: This software recommends a touch input device.
Server:
   Incompatible
   requires: This software needs a display for graphical content.
   recommends: This software needs a display for graphical content.
   recommends: This software recommends a touch input device.
Tablet:
  Compatible (100%)
Handset:
  Compatible (100%)

I hope this is helpful for people. Happy metadata writing!

Now this was quite a tease! For those who haven't seen it, I encourage you to check it out, it has a nice photo of a Debian t-shirt I did not know about, to quote the Fine Article:

Today, when going through a box of old T-shirts, I found the shirt I was looking for to bring to the occasion: [...] For the benefit of people who read this using a non-image-displaying browser or RSS client, they are respectively:

   10 years
  100 countries
 1000 maintainers
10000 packages

and

        1 project
       10 architectures
      100 countries
     1000 maintainers
    10000 packages
   100000 bugs fixed
  1000000 installations
 10000000 users
100000000 lines of code

20 years ago we celebrated eating grilled meat at J0rd1 s house. This year, we had vegan tostadas in the menu. And maybe we are no longer that young, but we are still very proud and happy of our project! Now How would numbers line up today for Debian, 20 years later? Have we managed to get the bugs fixed line increase by a factor of 10? Quite probably, the lines of code we also have, and I can only guess the number of users and installations, which was already just a wild guess back then, might have multiplied by over 10, at least if we count indirect users and installs as well

Now I don't know about you, but I really expected someone to come up with an answer to this, directly on Debian Planet! I have patiently waited for such an answer but enough is enough, I'm a Debian member, surely I can cull all of this together. So, low and behold, here are the actual numbers from 2023!

• 1 project: unchanged, although we could count 129 derivatives in the current census
• ~10 architectures: number almost unchanged, but the actual architectures are of course different (woody released with i386, m68k, Alpha, SPARC, PowerPC, ARM, IA-64, hppa, mips, s390; while bookworm released with actually 9 supported architectures instead of 10: i386, amd64, aarch64, armel, armhf, mipsel, mips64el, ppc64el, s390x)
• ~100 countries: actually 63 now, but I suspect we were generously rounding up last time as well (extracted with ldapsearch -b ou=users,dc=debian,dc=org -D uid=anarcat,ou=users,dc=debian,dc=org -ZZ -vLxW '(c=*)' c grep ^c: sort uniq -c sort -n wc -l on coccia)
• ~1000 maintainers: amazingly, almost unchanged (according to the last DPL vote, there were 831 DDs in 2003 and 996 in the last vote)
• 35000 packages: that number obviously increased quite a bit, but according to sources.debian.org, woody released with 5580 source packages and bookworm with 34782 source packages and according to UDD, there are actually 200k+ binary packages ( SELECT COUNT(DISTINCT package) FROM all_packages; => 211151)
• 1 000 000+ (OVER ONE MILLION!) bugs fixed! now that number grew by a whole order of magnitude, incredibly (934809 done, 16 fixed, 7595 forwarded, 82492 pending, 938 pending-fixed, according to UDD again, SELECT COUNT(id),status FROM all_bugs GROUP BY status;)
• ~1 000 000 installations (?): that one is hard to call. popcon has 225419 recorded installs, but it is likely an underestimate - hard to count
• how many users? even harder, we were claiming ten million users then, how many now? how can we even begin to tell, with Debian running on the space station?
• 1 000 000 000+ (OVER ONE BILLION!) lines of code: that, interestingly, has also grown by an order of magnitude, from 100M to 1B lines of code, again according to sources.debian.org, woody shipped with 143M lines of codes and bookworm with 1.3 billion lines of code

So it doesn't line up as nicely, but it looks something like this:

         1 project
        10 architectures
        30 years
       100 countries (actually 63, but we'd like to have yours!)
      1000 maintainers (yep, still there!)
     35000 packages
    211000 *binary* packages
   1000000 bugs fixed
1000000000 lines of code
 uncounted installations and users, we don't track you

So maybe the the more accurate, rounding to the nearest logarithm, would look something like:

         1 project
        10 architectures
       100 countries (actually 63, but we'd like to have yours!)
      1000 maintainers (yep, still there!)
    100000 packages
   1000000 bugs fixed
1000000000 lines of code
 uncounted installations and users, we don't track you

I really like how the "packages" and "bugs fixed" still have an order of magnitude between them there, but that the "bugs fixed" vs "lines of code" have an extra order of magnitude, that is we have fixed ten times less bugs per line of code since we last did this count, 20 years ago. Also, I am tempted to put 100 years in there, but that would be rounding up too much. Let's give it another 30 years first. Hopefully, some real scientist is going to balk at this crude methodology and come up with some more interesting numbers for the next t-shirt. Otherwise I'm available for bar mitzvahs and children parties.

I m one of the few folks left who run and maintain mail servers. Recently I had major troubles receiving mails from the mail servers used by a bank, and when asking my favourite search engine, I m clearly not the only one who ran into such an issue. Actually, I should have checked off the issue and not become a customer at that bank, but the tech nerd in me couldn t resist getting to the bottom of the problem. Since I got it working and this might be useful for others, here we are. :) I was trying to get an online banking account set up, but the corresponding account creation mail didn t arrive me, at all. Looking at my mail server logs, my postfix mail server didn t accept the mail due to:

postfix/smtpd[3319640]: warning: TLS library problem: error:1417A0C1:SSL routines:tls_post_process_client_hello:no shared cipher:../ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c:2283:
postfix/smtpd[3319640]: lost connection after STARTTLS from mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61]

Huh, what s going on here?! Let s increase the TLS loglevel (setting smtpd_tls_loglevel = 2) and retry. But how can I retry receiving yet another mail? Luckily, on the registration website of the bank there was a URL available, that let me request a one-time password. This triggered another mail, so I did that and managed to grab this in the logs:

postfix/smtpd[3320018]: initializing the server-side TLS engine
postfix/tlsmgr[3320020]: open smtpd TLS cache btree:/var/lib/postfix/smtpd_scache
postfix/tlsmgr[3320020]: tlsmgr_cache_run_event: start TLS smtpd session cache cleanup
postfix/smtpd[3320018]: connect from mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61]
postfix/smtpd[3320018]: setting up TLS connection from mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61]
postfix/smtpd[3320018]: mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61]: TLS cipher list "aNULL:-aNULL:HIGH:MEDIUM:+RC4:@STRENGTH"
postfix/smtpd[3320018]: SSL_accept:before SSL initialization
postfix/smtpd[3320018]: SSL_accept:before SSL initialization
postfix/smtpd[3320018]: SSL3 alert write:fatal:handshake failure
postfix/smtpd[3320018]: SSL_accept:error in error
postfix/smtpd[3320018]: SSL_accept error from mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61]: -1
postfix/smtpd[3320018]: warning: TLS library problem: error:1417A0C1:SSL routines:tls_post_process_client_hello:no shared cipher:../ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c:2283:
postfix/smtpd[3320018]: lost connection after STARTTLS from mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61]
postfix/smtpd[3320018]: disconnect from mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61] ehlo=1 starttls=0/1 commands=1/2
postfix/smtpd[3320018]: connect from mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61]
postfix/smtpd[3320018]: disconnect from mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61] ehlo=1 quit=1 commands=2

Ok, so this TLS cipher list aNULL:-aNULL:HIGH:MEDIUM:+RC4:@STRENGTH looked like the tls_medium_cipherlist setting in postfix, but which ciphers might we expect? Let s see what their SMTP server would speak to us:

% testssl --cipher-per-proto -t=smtp mx01.arz.at:25
[...]
Hexcode  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       KeyExch.   Encryption  Bits     Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SSLv2
SSLv3
TLS 1
TLS 1.1
TLS 1.2
 xc030   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384       ECDH 256   AESGCM      256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 xc028   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384           ECDH 256   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
 xc014   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA              ECDH 256   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x9d     AES256-GCM-SHA384                 RSA        AESGCM      256      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 x3d     AES256-SHA256                     RSA        AES         256      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
 x35     AES256-SHA                        RSA        AES         256      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 xc02f   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256       ECDH 256   AESGCM      128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 xc027   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256           ECDH 256   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 xc013   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA              ECDH 256   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x9c     AES128-GCM-SHA256                 RSA        AESGCM      128      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 x3c     AES128-SHA256                     RSA        AES         128      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 x2f     AES128-SHA                        RSA        AES         128      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
TLS 1.3

Looks like a very small subset of ciphers, and they don t seem to be talking TLS v1.3 at all? Not great. :( A nice web service to verify the situation from another point of view is checktls, which also confirmed this:

[000.705] 	<-- 	220 2.0.0 Ready to start TLS
[000.705] 		STARTTLS command works on this server
[001.260] 		Connection converted to SSL
		SSLVersion in use: TLSv1_2
		Cipher in use: ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384
		Perfect Forward Secrecy: yes
		Session Algorithm in use: Curve P-256 DHE(256 bits)
		Certificate #1 of 3 (sent by MX):
		Cert VALIDATED: ok
		Cert Hostname VERIFIED (mx01.arz.at = *.arz.at   DNS:*.arz.at   DNS:arz.at)
[...]
[001.517] 		TLS successfully started on this server

I got distracted by some other work, and when coming back to this problem, the one-time password procedure no longer worked, as the password reset URL was no longer valid. :( I managed to find the underlying URL, and with some web developer tools tinkering I could still use the website to let me trigger sending further one-time password mails, phew. Let s continue, so my mail server was running Debian/bullseye with postfix v3.5.18-0+deb11u1 and openssl v1.1.1n-0+deb11u5, let s see what it offers:

% testssl --cipher-per-proto -t=smtp mail.example.com:25
[...]
Hexcode  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       KeyExch.   Encryption  Bits     Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SSLv2
SSLv3
TLS 1
 xc00a   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA            ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 xc019   AECDH-AES256-SHA                  ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x3a     ADH-AES256-SHA                    DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x89     ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA               DH 2048    Camellia    256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
 xc009   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA            ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 xc018   AECDH-AES128-SHA                  ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x34     ADH-AES128-SHA                    DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x9b     ADH-SEED-SHA                      DH 2048    SEED        128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
 x46     ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA               DH 2048    Camellia    128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
TLS 1.1
 xc00a   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA            ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 xc019   AECDH-AES256-SHA                  ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x3a     ADH-AES256-SHA                    DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x89     ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA               DH 2048    Camellia    256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
 xc009   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA            ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 xc018   AECDH-AES128-SHA                  ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x34     ADH-AES128-SHA                    DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x9b     ADH-SEED-SHA                      DH 2048    SEED        128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
 x46     ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA               DH 2048    Camellia    128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
TLS 1.2
 xc02c   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384     ECDH 253   AESGCM      256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 xc024   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384         ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
 xc00a   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA            ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 xcca9   ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305     ECDH 253   ChaCha20    256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
 xc0af   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM8           ECDH 253   AESCCM8     256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
 xc0ad   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM            ECDH 253   AESCCM      256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
 xc073   ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384    ECDH 253   Camellia    256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
 xc019   AECDH-AES256-SHA                  ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 xa7     ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384             DH 2048    AESGCM      256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 x6d     ADH-AES256-SHA256                 DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
 x3a     ADH-AES256-SHA                    DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 xc5     ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA256            DH 2048    Camellia    256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
 x89     ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA               DH 2048    Camellia    256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
 xc05d   ECDHE-ECDSA-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384    ECDH 253   ARIAGCM     256      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
 xc02b   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256     ECDH 253   AESGCM      128      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 xc023   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256         ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 xc009   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA            ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 xc0ae   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM8           ECDH 253   AESCCM8     128      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
 xc0ac   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM            ECDH 253   AESCCM      128      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
 xc072   ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256    ECDH 253   Camellia    128      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
 xc018   AECDH-AES128-SHA                  ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 xa6     ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256             DH 2048    AESGCM      128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 x6c     ADH-AES128-SHA256                 DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 x34     ADH-AES128-SHA                    DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 xbf     ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA256            DH 2048    Camellia    128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
 x9b     ADH-SEED-SHA                      DH 2048    SEED        128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
 x46     ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA               DH 2048    Camellia    128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
 xc05c   ECDHE-ECDSA-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256    ECDH 253   ARIAGCM     128      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS 1.3
 x1302   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            ECDH 253   AESGCM      256      TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 x1303   TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256      ECDH 253   ChaCha20    256      TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
 x1301   TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256            ECDH 253   AESGCM      128      TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

Not so bad, but sadly no overlap with any of the ciphers that mx01.arz.at offers. What about disabling STARTTLS for the mx01.arz.at (+ mx02.arz.at being another one used by the relevant domain) mail servers when talking to mine? Let s try that:

% sudo postconf -nf smtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps
smtpd_discard_ehlo_keyword_address_maps =
    hash:/etc/postfix/smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords
% cat /etc/postfix/smtpd_discard_ehlo_keywords
# *disable* starttls for mx01.arz.at / mx02.arz.at:
193.110.182.61 starttls
193.110.182.62 starttls

But the remote mail server doesn t seem to send mails without TLS:

postfix/smtpd[4151799]: connect from mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61]
postfix/smtpd[4151799]: discarding EHLO keywords: STARTTLS
postfix/smtpd[4151799]: disconnect from mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61] ehlo=1 quit=1 commands=2

Let s verify this further, but without fiddling with the main mail server too much. We can add a dedicated service to postfix (see serverfault), and run it in verbose mode, to get more detailled logging:

% sudo postconf -Mf
[...]
10025      inet  n       -       -       -       -       smtpd
    -o syslog_name=postfix/smtpd/badstarttls
    -o smtpd_tls_security_level=none
    -o smtpd_helo_required=yes
    -o smtpd_helo_restrictions=pcre:/etc/postfix/helo_badstarttls_allow,reject
    -v
[...]
% cat /etc/postfix/helo_badstarttls_allow
/mx01.arz.at/ OK
/mx02.arz.at/ OK
/193.110.182.61/ OK
/193.110.182.62/ OK

We redirect the traffic from mx01.arz.at + mx02.arz.at towards our new postfix service, listening on port 10025:

% sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp -s 193.110.182.61 --dport 25 -j REDIRECT --to-port 10025
% sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp -s 193.110.182.62 --dport 25 -j REDIRECT --to-port 10025

With this setup we get very detailed logging, and it seems to confirm our suspicion that the mail server doesn t want to talk unencrypted with us:

[...]
postfix/smtpd/badstarttls/smtpd[3491900]: connect from mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61]
[...]
postfix/smtpd/badstarttls/smtpd[3491901]: disconnect from mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61] ehlo=1 quit=1 commands=2
postfix/smtpd/badstarttls/smtpd[3491901]: master_notify: status 1
postfix/smtpd/badstarttls/smtpd[3491901]: connection closed
[...]

Let s step back and revert those changes, back to our original postfix setup. Might the problem be related to our Let s Encrypt certificate? Let s see what we have:

% echo QUIT   openssl s_client -connect mail.example.com:25 -starttls
[...]
issuer=C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R3
---
No client certificate CA names sent
Peer signing digest: SHA384
Peer signature type: ECDSA
Server Temp Key: X25519, 253 bits
---
SSL handshake has read 4455 bytes and written 427 bytes
Verification: OK
---
New, TLSv1.3, Cipher is TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Server public key is 384 bit
[...]

We have an ECDSA based certificate, what about switching to RSA instead? Thanks to the wonderful dehydrated, this is as easy as:

% echo KEY_ALGO=rsa > certs/mail.example.com/config
% ./dehydrated -c --domain mail.example.com --force
% sudo systemctl reload postfix

With switching to RSA type key we get:

% echo QUIT   openssl s_client -connect mail.example.com:25 -starttls smtp
CONNECTED(00000003)
[...]
issuer=C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R3
---
No client certificate CA names sent
Peer signing digest: SHA256
Peer signature type: RSA-PSS
Server Temp Key: X25519, 253 bits
---
SSL handshake has read 5295 bytes and written 427 bytes
Verification: OK
---
New, TLSv1.3, Cipher is TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
Server public key is 4096 bit

Which ciphers do we offer now? Let s check:

% testssl --cipher-per-proto -t=smtp mail.example.com:25
[...]
Hexcode  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       KeyExch.   Encryption  Bits     Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SSLv2
SSLv3
TLS 1
 xc014   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA              ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x39     DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA                DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x88     DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA           DH 2048    Camellia    256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
 xc019   AECDH-AES256-SHA                  ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x3a     ADH-AES256-SHA                    DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x89     ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA               DH 2048    Camellia    256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
 x35     AES256-SHA                        RSA        AES         256      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x84     CAMELLIA256-SHA                   RSA        Camellia    256      TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
 xc013   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA              ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x33     DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA                DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x9a     DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA                  DH 2048    SEED        128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
 x45     DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA           DH 2048    Camellia    128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
 xc018   AECDH-AES128-SHA                  ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x34     ADH-AES128-SHA                    DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x9b     ADH-SEED-SHA                      DH 2048    SEED        128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
 x46     ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA               DH 2048    Camellia    128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
 x2f     AES128-SHA                        RSA        AES         128      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x96     SEED-SHA                          RSA        SEED        128      TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
 x41     CAMELLIA128-SHA                   RSA        Camellia    128      TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
TLS 1.1
 xc014   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA              ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x39     DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA                DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x88     DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA           DH 2048    Camellia    256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
 xc019   AECDH-AES256-SHA                  ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x3a     ADH-AES256-SHA                    DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x89     ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA               DH 2048    Camellia    256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
 x35     AES256-SHA                        RSA        AES         256      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x84     CAMELLIA256-SHA                   RSA        Camellia    256      TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
 xc013   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA              ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x33     DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA                DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x9a     DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA                  DH 2048    SEED        128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
 x45     DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA           DH 2048    Camellia    128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
 xc018   AECDH-AES128-SHA                  ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x34     ADH-AES128-SHA                    DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x9b     ADH-SEED-SHA                      DH 2048    SEED        128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
 x46     ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA               DH 2048    Camellia    128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
 x2f     AES128-SHA                        RSA        AES         128      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x96     SEED-SHA                          RSA        SEED        128      TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
 x41     CAMELLIA128-SHA                   RSA        Camellia    128      TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
TLS 1.2
 xc030   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384       ECDH 253   AESGCM      256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 xc028   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384           ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
 xc014   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA              ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x9f     DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384         DH 2048    AESGCM      256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 xcca8   ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305       ECDH 253   ChaCha20    256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
 xccaa   DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305         DH 2048    ChaCha20    256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
 xc0a3   DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM8               DH 2048    AESCCM8     256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
 xc09f   DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM                DH 2048    AESCCM      256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
 x6b     DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256             DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
 x39     DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA                DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 xc077   ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384      ECDH 253   Camellia    256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384
 xc4     DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256        DH 2048    Camellia    256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
 x88     DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA           DH 2048    Camellia    256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
 xc019   AECDH-AES256-SHA                  ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 xa7     ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384             DH 2048    AESGCM      256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 x6d     ADH-AES256-SHA256                 DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
 x3a     ADH-AES256-SHA                    DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 xc5     ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA256            DH 2048    Camellia    256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
 x89     ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA               DH 2048    Camellia    256      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
 x9d     AES256-GCM-SHA384                 RSA        AESGCM      256      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 xc0a1   AES256-CCM8                       RSA        AESCCM8     256      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
 xc09d   AES256-CCM                        RSA        AESCCM      256      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
 x3d     AES256-SHA256                     RSA        AES         256      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
 x35     AES256-SHA                        RSA        AES         256      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 xc0     CAMELLIA256-SHA256                RSA        Camellia    256      TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256
 x84     CAMELLIA256-SHA                   RSA        Camellia    256      TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA
 xc051   ARIA256-GCM-SHA384                RSA        ARIAGCM     256      TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
 xc053   DHE-RSA-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384        DH 2048    ARIAGCM     256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
 xc061   ECDHE-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384          ECDH 253   ARIAGCM     256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
 xc02f   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256       ECDH 253   AESGCM      128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 xc027   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256           ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 xc013   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA              ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x9e     DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256         DH 2048    AESGCM      128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 xc0a2   DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM8               DH 2048    AESCCM8     128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
 xc09e   DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM                DH 2048    AESCCM      128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
 xc0a0   AES128-CCM8                       RSA        AESCCM8     128      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
 xc09c   AES128-CCM                        RSA        AESCCM      128      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
 x67     DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256             DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 x33     DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA                DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 xc076   ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256      ECDH 253   Camellia    128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
 xbe     DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256        DH 2048    Camellia    128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
 x9a     DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA                  DH 2048    SEED        128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
 x45     DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA           DH 2048    Camellia    128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
 xc018   AECDH-AES128-SHA                  ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 xa6     ADH-AES128-GCM-SHA256             DH 2048    AESGCM      128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 x6c     ADH-AES128-SHA256                 DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 x34     ADH-AES128-SHA                    DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 xbf     ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA256            DH 2048    Camellia    128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
 x9b     ADH-SEED-SHA                      DH 2048    SEED        128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
 x46     ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA               DH 2048    Camellia    128      TLS_DH_anon_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
 x9c     AES128-GCM-SHA256                 RSA        AESGCM      128      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 x3c     AES128-SHA256                     RSA        AES         128      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 x2f     AES128-SHA                        RSA        AES         128      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 xba     CAMELLIA128-SHA256                RSA        Camellia    128      TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256
 x96     SEED-SHA                          RSA        SEED        128      TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA
 x41     CAMELLIA128-SHA                   RSA        Camellia    128      TLS_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA
 xc050   ARIA128-GCM-SHA256                RSA        ARIAGCM     128      TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
 xc052   DHE-RSA-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256        DH 2048    ARIAGCM     128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
 xc060   ECDHE-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256          ECDH 253   ARIAGCM     128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS 1.3
 x1302   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            ECDH 253   AESGCM      256      TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 x1303   TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256      ECDH 253   ChaCha20    256      TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
 x1301   TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256            ECDH 253   AESGCM      128      TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

With switching our SSL certificate to RSA, we gained around 51 new cipher options, amongst them being ones that also mx01.arz.at claimed to support. FTR, the result from above is what you get with the default settings for postfix v3.5.18, being:

smtpd_tls_ciphers = medium
smtpd_tls_mandatory_ciphers = medium
smtpd_tls_mandatory_exclude_ciphers =
smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols = !SSLv2, !SSLv3

But the delay between triggering the password reset mail and getting a mail server connect was getting bigger and bigger. Therefore while waiting for the next mail to arrive, I decided to capture the network traffic, to be able to look further into this if it should continue to be failing:

% sudo tshark -n -i eth0 -s 65535 -w arz.pcap -f "host 193.110.182.61 or host 193.110.182.62"

A few hours later the mail server connected again, and the mail went through!

postfix/smtpd[4162835]: connect from mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61]
postfix/smtpd[4162835]: Anonymous TLS connection established from mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61]: TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)
postfix/smtpd[4162835]: E50D6401E6: client=mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61]
postfix/smtpd[4162835]: disconnect from mx01.arz.at[193.110.182.61] ehlo=2 starttls=1 mail=1 rcpt=1 data=1 quit=1 commands=7

Now also having the captured network traffic, we can check the details there:

[...]
% tshark -o smtp.decryption:true -r arz.pcap
    1 0.000000000 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TCP 74 24699   25 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=2261106119 TSecr=0 WS=128
    2 0.000042827 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TCP 74 25   24699 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65160 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=3233422181 TSecr=2261106119 WS=128
    3 0.020719269 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TCP 66 24699   25 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=29312 Len=0 TSval=2261106139 TSecr=3233422181
    4 0.022883259 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 SMTP 96 S: 220 mail.example.com ESMTP
    5 0.043682626 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TCP 66 24699   25 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=31 Win=29312 Len=0 TSval=2261106162 TSecr=3233422203
    6 0.043799047 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 SMTP 84 C: EHLO mx01.arz.at
    7 0.043811363 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TCP 66 25   24699 [ACK] Seq=31 Ack=19 Win=65280 Len=0 TSval=3233422224 TSecr=2261106162
    8 0.043898412 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 SMTP 253 S: 250-mail.example.com   PIPELINING   SIZE 20240000   VRFY   ETRN   AUTH PLAIN   AUTH=PLAIN   ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES   8BITMIME   DSN   SMTPUTF8   CHUNKING
    9 0.064625499 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 SMTP 72 C: QUIT
   10 0.064750257 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 SMTP 81 S: 221 2.0.0 Bye
   11 0.064760200 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TCP 66 25   24699 [FIN, ACK] Seq=233 Ack=25 Win=65280 Len=0 TSval=3233422245 TSecr=2261106183
   12 0.085573715 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TCP 66 24699   25 [FIN, ACK] Seq=25 Ack=234 Win=30336 Len=0 TSval=2261106204 TSecr=3233422245
   13 0.085610229 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TCP 66 25   24699 [ACK] Seq=234 Ack=26 Win=65280 Len=0 TSval=3233422266 TSecr=2261106204
   14 1799.888108373 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TCP 74 10330   25 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=29200 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=2262906007 TSecr=0 WS=128
   15 1799.888161311 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TCP 74 25   10330 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65160 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM=1 TSval=3235222069 TSecr=2262906007 WS=128
   16 1799.909030335 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TCP 66 10330   25 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=29312 Len=0 TSval=2262906028 TSecr=3235222069
   17 1799.956621011 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 SMTP 96 S: 220 mail.example.com ESMTP
   18 1799.977229656 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TCP 66 10330   25 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=31 Win=29312 Len=0 TSval=2262906096 TSecr=3235222137
   19 1799.977229698 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 SMTP 84 C: EHLO mx01.arz.at
   20 1799.977266759 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TCP 66 25   10330 [ACK] Seq=31 Ack=19 Win=65280 Len=0 TSval=3235222158 TSecr=2262906096
   21 1799.977351663 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 SMTP 267 S: 250-mail.example.com   PIPELINING   SIZE 20240000   VRFY   ETRN   STARTTLS   AUTH PLAIN   AUTH=PLAIN   ENHANCEDSTATUSCODES   8BITMIME   DSN   SMTPUTF8   CHUNKING
   22 1800.011494861 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 SMTP 76 C: STARTTLS
   23 1800.011589267 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 SMTP 96 S: 220 2.0.0 Ready to start TLS
   24 1800.032812294 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TLSv1 223 Client Hello
   25 1800.032987264 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TLSv1.2 2962 Server Hello
   26 1800.032995513 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TCP 1266 25   10330 [PSH, ACK] Seq=3158 Ack=186 Win=65152 Len=1200 TSval=3235222214 TSecr=2262906151 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
   27 1800.053546755 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TCP 66 10330   25 [ACK] Seq=186 Ack=3158 Win=36096 Len=0 TSval=2262906172 TSecr=3235222214
   28 1800.092852469 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TCP 66 10330   25 [ACK] Seq=186 Ack=4358 Win=39040 Len=0 TSval=2262906212 TSecr=3235222214
   29 1800.092892905 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TLSv1.2 900 Certificate, Server Key Exchange, Server Hello Done
   30 1800.113546769 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TCP 66 10330   25 [ACK] Seq=186 Ack=5192 Win=41856 Len=0 TSval=2262906232 TSecr=3235222273
   31 1800.114763363 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TLSv1.2 192 Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
   32 1800.115000416 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TLSv1.2 117 Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
   33 1800.136070200 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TLSv1.2 113 Application Data
   34 1800.136155526 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TLSv1.2 282 Application Data
   35 1800.158854473 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TLSv1.2 162 Application Data
   36 1800.159254794 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TLSv1.2 109 Application Data
   37 1800.180286407 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TLSv1.2 144 Application Data
   38 1800.223005960 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TCP 66 25   10330 [ACK] Seq=5502 Ack=533 Win=65152 Len=0 TSval=3235222404 TSecr=2262906299
   39 1802.230300244 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TLSv1.2 146 Application Data
   40 1802.251994333 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TCP 2962 [TCP segment of a reassembled PDU]
   41 1802.252034015 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TCP 66 25   10330 [ACK] Seq=5582 Ack=3429 Win=63616 Len=0 TSval=3235224433 TSecr=2262908371
   42 1802.252279083 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TLSv1.2 1295 Application Data
   43 1802.252288316 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TCP 66 25   10330 [ACK] Seq=5582 Ack=4658 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=3235224433 TSecr=2262908371
   44 1802.272816060 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TLSv1.2 833 Application Data, Application Data
   45 1802.272827542 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TCP 66 25   10330 [ACK] Seq=5582 Ack=5425 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=3235224453 TSecr=2262908392
   46 1802.338807683 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TLSv1.2 131 Application Data
   47 1802.398968611 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TCP 66 10330   25 [ACK] Seq=5425 Ack=5647 Win=44800 Len=0 TSval=2262908518 TSecr=3235224519
   48 1863.257457500 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TLSv1.2 101 Application Data
   49 1863.257495688 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TCP 66 25   10330 [ACK] Seq=5647 Ack=5460 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=3235285438 TSecr=2262969376
   50 1863.257654942 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TLSv1.2 110 Application Data
   51 1863.257721010 203.0.113.42   193.110.182.61 TLSv1.2 97 Encrypted Alert
   52 1863.278242216 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TCP 66 10330   25 [ACK] Seq=5460 Ack=5691 Win=44800 Len=0 TSval=2262969397 TSecr=3235285438
   53 1863.278464176 193.110.182.61   203.0.113.42 TCP 66 10330   25 [RST, ACK] Seq=5460 Ack=5723 Win=44800 Len=0 TSval=2262969397 TSecr=3235285438

% tshark -O tls -r arz.pcap
[...]
Transport Layer Security
    TLSv1 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
        Content Type: Handshake (22)
        Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
        Length: 152
        Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
            Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
            Length: 148
            Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
            Random: 4575d1e7c93c09a564edc00b8b56ea6f5d826f8cfe78eb980c451a70a9c5123f
                GMT Unix Time: Dec  5, 2006 21:09:11.000000000 CET
                Random Bytes: c93c09a564edc00b8b56ea6f5d826f8cfe78eb980c451a70a9c5123f
            Session ID Length: 0
            Cipher Suites Length: 26
            Cipher Suites (13 suites)
                Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030)
                Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0xc02f)
                Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 (0xc028)
                Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0xc027)
                Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014)
                Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013)
                Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0x009d)
                Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 (0x009c)
                Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 (0x003d)
                Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 (0x003c)
                Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0035)
                Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x002f)
                Cipher Suite: TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV (0x00ff)
[...]
Transport Layer Security
    TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Server Hello
        Content Type: Handshake (22)
        Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
        Length: 89
        Handshake Protocol: Server Hello
            Handshake Type: Server Hello (2)
            Length: 85
            Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
            Random: cf2ed24e3300e95e5f56023bf8b4e5904b862bb2ed8a5796444f574e47524401
                GMT Unix Time: Feb 23, 2080 23:16:46.000000000 CET
                Random Bytes: 3300e95e5f56023bf8b4e5904b862bb2ed8a5796444f574e47524401
            Session ID Length: 32
            Session ID: 63d041b126ecebf857d685abd9d4593c46a3672e1ad76228f3eacf2164f86fb9
            Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (0xc030)
[...]

In this network dump we see what cipher suites are offered, and the TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 here is the Cipher Suite Name in IANA/RFC speak. Whis corresponds to the ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 in openssl speak (see Mozilla s Mozilla s cipher suite correspondence table), which we also saw in the postfix log. Mission accomplished! :) Now, if we re interested in avoiding certain ciphers and increase security level, we can e.g. get rid of the SEED, CAMELLIA and all anonymous ciphers, and could accept only TLS v1.2 + v1.3, by further adjusting postfix s main.cf:

smtpd_tls_ciphers = high
smtpd_tls_exclude_ciphers = aNULL CAMELLIA
smtpd_tls_mandatory_ciphers = high
smtpd_tls_mandatory_protocols = TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3
smtpd_tls_protocols = TLSv1.2 TLSv1.3

Which would then gives us:

% testssl --cipher-per-proto -t=smtp mail.example.com:25
[...]
Hexcode  Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)       KeyExch.   Encryption  Bits     Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SSLv2
SSLv3
TLS 1
TLS 1.1
TLS 1.2
 xc030   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384       ECDH 253   AESGCM      256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 xc028   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384           ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
 xc014   ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA              ECDH 253   AES         256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x9f     DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384         DH 2048    AESGCM      256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 xcca8   ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305       ECDH 253   ChaCha20    256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
 xccaa   DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305         DH 2048    ChaCha20    256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
 xc0a3   DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM8               DH 2048    AESCCM8     256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
 xc09f   DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM                DH 2048    AESCCM      256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
 x6b     DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256             DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
 x39     DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA                DH 2048    AES         256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 x9d     AES256-GCM-SHA384                 RSA        AESGCM      256      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 xc0a1   AES256-CCM8                       RSA        AESCCM8     256      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8
 xc09d   AES256-CCM                        RSA        AESCCM      256      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
 x3d     AES256-SHA256                     RSA        AES         256      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
 x35     AES256-SHA                        RSA        AES         256      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 xc051   ARIA256-GCM-SHA384                RSA        ARIAGCM     256      TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
 xc053   DHE-RSA-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384        DH 2048    ARIAGCM     256      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
 xc061   ECDHE-ARIA256-GCM-SHA384          ECDH 253   ARIAGCM     256      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
 xc02f   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256       ECDH 253   AESGCM      128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 xc027   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256           ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 xc013   ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA              ECDH 253   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x9e     DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256         DH 2048    AESGCM      128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 xc0a2   DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM8               DH 2048    AESCCM8     128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
 xc09e   DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM                DH 2048    AESCCM      128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
 xc0a0   AES128-CCM8                       RSA        AESCCM8     128      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8
 xc09c   AES128-CCM                        RSA        AESCCM      128      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
 x67     DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256             DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 x33     DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA                DH 2048    AES         128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 x9c     AES128-GCM-SHA256                 RSA        AESGCM      128      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 x3c     AES128-SHA256                     RSA        AES         128      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
 x2f     AES128-SHA                        RSA        AES         128      TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 xc050   ARIA128-GCM-SHA256                RSA        ARIAGCM     128      TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
 xc052   DHE-RSA-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256        DH 2048    ARIAGCM     128      TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
 xc060   ECDHE-ARIA128-GCM-SHA256          ECDH 253   ARIAGCM     128      TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
TLS 1.3
 x1302   TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384            ECDH 253   AESGCM      256      TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
 x1303   TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256      ECDH 253   ChaCha20    256      TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
 x1301   TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256            ECDH 253   AESGCM      128      TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256

Don t forget to also adjust the smpt_tls_* accordingly (for your sending side). For further information see the Postfix TLS Support documentation. Also check out options like tls_ssl_options (setting it to e.g. NO_COMPRESSION) and tls_preempt_cipherlist (setting it to yes would prefer the servers order of ciphers over clients). Conclusions:

• no matter what you change in your mail server settings, be aware that the type of your SSL certificate also matters for what ciphers are offered and used
• there are mail servers out there that don t support SSL certificates with ECDSA, using RSA for those ensure better compatibility (nowadays postfix supports parallel usage of ECDSA and RSA keys BTW, check out the smtpd_tls_eccert_file + smtpd_tls_eckey_file options)
• testssl is a very useful tool, especially with its cipher-per-proto -t=smtp option to check SMTP servers
• if you re uncertain what s going on, consider capturing network data (tshark/tcpdump/ are your friends)
• review your postfix configuration and logs every now and then :)

On Sunday 17 September 2023, the annual Debian Developers and Contributors Conference came to a close. Over 474 attendees representing 35 countries from around the world came together for a combined 89 events made up of Talks, Discussons, Birds of a Feather (BoF) gatherings, workshops, and activities in support of furthering our distribution, learning from our mentors and peers, building our community, and having a bit of fun. The conference was preceded by the annual DebCamp hacking session held September 3d through September 9th where Debian Developers and Contributors convened to focus on their Individual Debian related projects or work in team sprints geared toward in-person collaboration in developing Debian. In particular this year Sprints took place to advance development in Mobian/Debian, Reproducible Builds, and Python in Debian. This year also featured a BootCamp that was held for newcomers staged by a team of dedicated mentors who shared hands-on experience in Debian and offered a deeper understanding of how to work in and contribute to the community. The actual Debian Developers Conference started on Sunday 10 September 2023. In addition to the traditional 'Bits from the DPL' talk, the continuous key-signing party, lightning talks and the announcement of next year's DebConf4, there were several update sessions shared by internal projects and teams. Many of the hosted discussion sessions were presented by our technical teams who highlighted the work and focus of the Long Term Support (LTS), Android tools, Debian Derivatives, Debian Installer, Debian Image, and the Debian Science teams. The Python, Perl, and Ruby programming language teams also shared updates on their work and efforts. Two of the larger local Debian communities, Debian Brasil and Debian India shared how their respective collaborations in Debian moved the project forward and how they attracted new members and opportunities both in Debian, F/OSS, and the sciences with their HowTos of demonstrated community engagement. The schedule was updated each day with planned and ad-hoc activities introduced by attendees over the course of the conference. Several activities that were unable to be held in past years due to the Global COVID-19 Pandemic were celebrated as they returned to the conference's schedule: a job fair, the open-mic and poetry night, the traditional Cheese and Wine party, the group photos and the Day Trips. For those who were not able to attend, most of the talks and sessions were videoed for live room streams with the recorded videos to be made available later through the Debian meetings archive website. Almost all of the sessions facilitated remote participation via IRC messaging apps or online collaborative text documents which allowed remote attendees to 'be in the room' to ask questions or share comments with the speaker or assembled audience. DebConf23 saw over 4.3 TiB of data streamed, 55 hours of scheduled talks, 23 network access points, 11 network switches, 75 kb of equipment imported, 400 meters of gaffer tape used, 1,463 viewed streaming hours, 461 T-shirts, 35 country Geoip viewers, 5 day trips, and an average of 169 meals planned per day. All of these events, activies, conversations, and streams coupled with our love, interest, and participation in Debian annd F/OSS certainly made this conference an overall success both here in Kochi, India and On-line around the world. The DebConf23 website will remain active for archival purposes and will continue to offer links to the presentations and videos of talks and events. Next year, DebConf24 will be held in Haifa, Israel. As tradition follows before the next DebConf the local organizers in Israel will start the conference activites with DebCamp with particular focus on individual and team work towards improving the distribution. DebConf is committed to a safe and welcome environment for all participants. See the web page about the Code of Conduct in DebConf23 website for more details on this. Debian thanks the commitment of numerous sponsors to support DebConf23, particularly our Platinum Sponsors: Infomaniak, Proxmox, and Siemens. We also wish to thank our Video and Infrastructure teams, the DebConf23 and DebConf commitiees, our host nation of India, and each and every person who helped contribute to this event and to Debian overall. Thank you all for your work in helping Debian continue to be "The Universal Operating System". See you next year! About Debian The Debian Project was founded in 1993 by Ian Murdock to be a truly free community project. Since then the project has grown to be one of the largest and most influential open source projects. Thousands of volunteers from all over the world work together to create and maintain Debian software. Available in 70 languages, and supporting a huge range of computer types, Debian calls itself the universal operating system. About DebConf DebConf is the Debian Project's developer conference. In addition to a full schedule of technical, social and policy talks, DebConf provides an opportunity for developers, contributors and other interested people to meet in person and work together more closely. It has taken place annually since 2000 in locations as varied as Scotland, Argentina, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. More information about DebConf is available from https://debconf.org/. About Infomaniak Infomaniak is a key player in the European cloud market and the leading developer of Web technologies in Switzerland. It aims to be an independent European alternative to the web giants and is committed to an ethical and sustainable Web that respects privacy and creates local jobs. Infomaniak develops cloud solutions (IaaS, PaaS, VPS), productivity tools for online collaboration and video and radio streaming services. About Proxmox Proxmox develops powerful, yet easy-to-use open-source server software. The product portfolio from Proxmox, including server virtualization, backup, and email security, helps companies of any size, sector, or industry to simplify their IT infrastructures. The Proxmox solutions are based on the great Debian platform, and we are happy that we can give back to the community by sponsoring DebConf23. About Siemens Siemens is technology company focused on industry, infrastructure and transport. From resource-efficient factories, resilient supply chains, smarter buildings and grids, to cleaner and more comfortable transportation, and advanced healthcare, the company creates technology with purpose adding real value for customers. By combining the real and the digital worlds, Siemens empowers its customers to transform their industries and markets, helping them to enhance the everyday of billions of people. Contact Information For further information, please visit the DebConf23 web page at https://debconf23.debconf.org/ or send mail to press@debian.org.

Sometimes we want better-than-firewall security for things. For instance:

1. An industrial control system for a municipal water-treatment plant should never have data come in or out
2. Or, a variant of the industrial control system: it should only permit telemetry and monitoring data out, and nothing else in or out
3. A system dedicated to keeping your GPG private keys secure should only have material to sign (or decrypt) come in, and signatures (or decrypted data) go out
4. A system keeping your tax records should normally only have new records go in, but may on occasion have data go out (eg, to print a copy of an old record)

In this article, I ll talk about the high side (the high-security or high-sensitivity systems) and the low side (the lower-sensitivity or general-purpose systems). For the sake of simplicity, I ll assume the high side is a single machine, but it could as well be a whole network. Let s focus on examples 3 and 4 to make things simpler. Let s consider the primary concern to be data exfiltration (someone stealing your data), with a secondary concern of data integrity (somebody modifying or destroying your data). You might think the safest possible approach is Airgapped that is, there is literal no physical network connection to the machine at all. This help! But then, the problem becomes: how do we deal with the inevitable need to legitimately get things on or off of the system? As I wrote in Dead USB Drives Are Fine: Building a Reliable Sneakernet, by using tools such as NNCP, you can certainly create a sneakernet : using USB drives as transport. While this is a very secure setup, as with most things in security, it s less than perfect. The Wikipedia airgap article discusses some ways airgapped machines can still be exploited. It mentions that security holes relating to removable media have been exploited in the past. There are also other ways to get data out; for instance, Debian ships with gensio and minimodem, both of which can transfer data acoustically. But let s back up and think about why we think of airgapped machines as so much more secure, and what the failure modes of other approaches might be.

What about firewalls? You could very easily set up high-side machine that is on a network, but is restricted to only one outbound TCP port. There could be a local firewall, and perhaps also a special port on an external firewall that implements the same restrictions. A variant on this approach would be two computers connected directly by a crossover cable, though this doesn t necessarily imply being more secure. Of course, the concern about a local firewall is that it could potentially be compromised. An external firewall might too; for instance, if your credentials to it were on a machine that got compromised. This kind of dual compromise may be unlikely, but it is possible. We can also think about the complexity in a network stack and firewall configuration, and think that there may be various opportunities to have things misconfigured or buggy in a system of that complexity. Another consideration is that data could be sent at any time, potentially making it harder to detect. On the other hand, network monitoring tools are commonplace. On the other hand, it is convenient and cheap. I use a system along those lines to do my backups. Data is sent, gpg-encrypted and then encrypted again at the NNCP layer, to the backup server. The NNCP process on the backup server runs as an untrusted user, and dumps the gpg-encrypted files to a secure location that is then processed by a cron job using Filespooler. The backup server is on a dedicated firewall port, with a dedicated subnet. The only ports allowed out are for NNCP and NTP, and offsite backups. There is no default gateway. Not even DNS is permitted out (the firewall does the appropriate redirection). There is one pinhole allowed out, where a subset of the backup data is sent offsite. I initially used USB drives as transport, and it had no network connection at all. But there were disadvantages to doing this for backups particularly that I d have no backups for as long as I d forget to move the drives. The backup system also would have clock drift, and the offsite backup picture was more challenging. (The clock drift was a problem because I use 2FA on the system; a password, plus a TOTP generated by a Yubikey) This is pretty good security, I d think. What are the weak spots? Well, if there were somehow a bug in the NNCP client, and the remote NNCP were compromised, that could lead to a compromise of the NNCP account. But this itself would accomplish little; some other vulnerability would have to be exploited on the backup server, because the NNCP account can t see plaintext data at all. I use borgbackup to send a subset of backup data offsite over ssh. borgbackup has to run as root to be able to access all the files, but the ssh it calls runs as a separate user. A ssh vulnerability is therefore unlikely to cause much damage. If, somehow, the remote offsite system were compromised and it was able to exploit a security issue in the local borgbackup, that would be a problem. But that sounds like a remote possibility. borgbackup itself can t even be used over a sneakernet since it is not asynchronous. A more secure solution would probably be using something like dar over NNCP. This would eliminate the ssh installation entirely, and allow a complete isolation between the data-access and the communication stacks, and notably not require bidirectional communication. Logic separation matters too. My Roundup of Data Backup and Archiving Tools may be helpful here. Other attack vectors could be a vulnerability in the kernel s networking stack, local root exploits that could be combined with exploiting NNCP or borgbackup to gain root, or local misconfiguration that makes the sandboxes around NNCP and borgbackup less secure. Because this system is in my basement in a utility closet with no chairs and no good place for a console, I normally manage it via a serial console. While it s a dedicated line between the system and another machine, if the other machine is compromised or an adversary gets access to the physical line, credentials (and perhaps even data) could leak, albeit slowly. But we can do much better with serial lines. Let s take a look.

Serial lines Some of us remember RS-232 serial lines and their once-ubiquitous DB-9 connectors. Traditionally, their speed maxxed out at 115.2Kbps. Serial lines have the benefit that they can be a direct application-to-application link. In my backup example above, a serial line could directly link the NNCP daemon on one system with the NNCP caller on another, with no firewall or anything else necessary. It is simply up to those programs to open the serial device appropriately. This isn t perfect, however. Unlike TCP over Ethernet, a serial line has no inherent error checking. Modern programs such as NNCP and ssh assume that a lower layer is making the link completely clean and error-free for them, and will interpret any corruption as an attempt to tamper and sever the connection. However, there is a solution to that: gensio. In my page Using gensio and ser2net, I discuss how to run NNCP and ssh over gensio. gensio is a generic framework that can add framing, error checking, and retransmit to an unreliable link such as a serial port. It can also add encryption and authentication using TLS, which could be particularly useful for applications that aren t already doing that themselves. More traditional solutions for serial communications have their own built-in error correction. For instance, UUCP and Kermit both were designed in an era of noisy serial lines and might be an excellent fit for some use cases. The ZModem protocol also might be, though it offers somewhat less flexibility and automation than Kermit. I have found that certain USB-to-serial adapters by Gearmo will actually run at up to 2Mbps on a serial line! Look for the ones on their spec pages with a FTDI chipset rated at 920Kbps. It turns out they can successfully be driven faster, especially if gensio s relpkt is used. I ve personally verified 2Mbps operation (Linux port speed 2000000) on Gearmo s USA-FTDI2X and the USA-FTDI4X. (I haven t seen any single-port options from Gearmo with the 920Kbps chipset, but they may exist). Still, even at 2Mbps, speed may well be a limiting factor with some applications. If what you need is a console and some textual or batch data, it s probably fine. If you are sending 500GB backup files, you might look for something else. In theory, this USB to RS-422 adapter should work at 10Mbps, but I haven t tried it. But if the speed works, running a dedicated application over a serial link could be a nice and fairly secure option. One of the benefits of the airgapped approach is that data never leaves unless you are physically aware of transporting a USB stick. Of course, you may not be physically aware of what is ON that stick in the event of a compromise. This could easily be solved with a serial approach by, say, only plugging in the cable when you have data to transfer.

Data diodes A traditional diode lets electrical current flow in only one direction. A data diode is the same concept, but for data: a hardware device that allows data to flow in only one direction. This could be useful, for instance, in the tax records system that should only receive data, or the industrial system that should only send it. Wikipedia claims that the simplest kind of data diode is a fiber link with transceivers connected in only one direction. I think you could go one simpler: a serial cable with only ground and TX connected at one end, wired to ground and RX at the other. (I haven t tried this.) This approach does have some challenges:

• Many existing protocols assume a bidirectional link and won t be usable
• There is a challenge of confirming data was successfully received. For a situation like telemetry, maybe it doesn t matter; another observation will come along in a minute. But for sending important documents, one wants to make sure they were properly received.

In some cases, the solution might be simple. For instance, with telemetry, just writing out data down the serial port in a simple format may be enough. For sending files, various mitigations, such as sending them multiple times, etc., might help. You might also look into FEC-supporting infrastructure such as blkar and flute, but these don t provide an absolute guarantee. There is no perfect solution to knowing when a file has been successfully received if the data communication is entirely one-way.

Audio transport I hinted above that minimodem and gensio both are software audio modems. That is, you could literally use speakers and microphones, or alternatively audio cables, as a means of getting data into or out of these systems. This is pretty limited; it is 1200bps, and often half-duplex, and could literally be disrupted by barking dogs in some setups. But hey, it s an option.

Airgapped with USB transport This is the scenario I began with, and named some of the possible pitfalls above as well. In addition to those, note also that USB drives aren t necessarily known for their error-free longevity. Be prepared for failure.

Concluding thoughts I wanted to lay out a few things in this post. First, that simply being airgapped is generally a step forward in security, but is not perfect. Secondly, that both physical and logical separation matter. And finally, that while tools like NNCP can make airgapped-with-USB-drive-transport a doable reality, there are also alternatives worth considering especially serial ports, firewalled hard-wired Ethernet, data diodes, and so forth. I think serial links, in particular, have been largely forgotten these days. Note: This article also appears on my website, where it may be periodically updated.

TPMs contain a set of registers ("Platform Configuration Registers", or PCRs) that are used to track what a system boots. Each time a new event is measured, a cryptographic hash representing that event is passed to the TPM. The TPM appends that hash to the existing value in the PCR, hashes that, and stores the final result in the PCR. This means that while the PCR's value depends on the precise sequence and value of the hashes presented to it, the PCR value alone doesn't tell you what those individual events were. Different PCRs are used to store different event types, but there are still more events than there are PCRs so we can't avoid this problem by simply storing each event separately.

This is solved using the event log. The event log is simply a record of each event, stored in RAM. The algorithm the TPM uses to calculate the PCR values is known, so we can reproduce that by simply taking the events from the event log and replaying the series of events that were passed to the TPM. If the final calculated value is the same as the value in the PCR, we know that the event log is accurate, which means we now know the value of each individual event and can make an appropriate judgement regarding its security.

If any value in the event log is invalid, we'll calculate a different PCR value and it won't match. This isn't terribly helpful - we know that at least one entry in the event log doesn't match what was passed to the TPM, but we don't know which entry. That means we can't trust any of the events associated with that PCR. If you're trying to make a security determination based on this, that's going to be a problem.

PCR 7 is used to track information about the secure boot policy on the system. It contains measurements of whether or not secure boot is enabled, and which keys are trusted and untrusted on the system in question. This is extremely helpful if you want to verify that a system booted with secure boot enabled before allowing it to do something security or safety critical. Unfortunately, if the device gives you an event log that doesn't replay correctly for PCR 7, you now have no idea what the security state of the system is.

We ran into that this week. Examination of the event log revealed an additional event other than the expected ones - a measurement accompanied by the string "Boot Guard Measured S-CRTM". Boot Guard is an Intel feature where the CPU verifies the firmware is signed with a trusted key before executing it, and measures information about the firmware in the process. Previously I'd only encountered this as a measurement into PCR 0, which is the PCR used to track information about the firmware itself. But it turns out that at least some versions of Boot Guard also measure information about the Boot Guard policy into PCR 7. The argument for this is that this is effectively part of the secure boot policy - having a measurement of the Boot Guard state tells you whether Boot Guard was enabled, which tells you whether or not the CPU verified a signature on your firmware before running it (as I wrote before, I think Boot Guard has user-hostile default behaviour, and that enforcing this on consumer devices is a bad idea).

But there's a problem here. The event log is created by the firmware, and the Boot Guard measurements occur before the firmware is executed. So how do we get a log that represents them? That one's fairly simple - the firmware simply re-calculates the same measurements that Boot Guard did and creates a log entry after the fact[1]. All good.

Except. What if the firmware screws up the calculation and comes up with a different answer? The entry in the event log will now not match what was sent to the TPM, and replaying will fail. And without knowing what the actual value should be, there's no way to fix this, which means there's no way to verify the contents of PCR 7 and determine whether or not secure boot was enabled.

But there's still a fundamental source of truth - the measurement that was sent to the TPM in the first place. Inspired by Henri Nurmi's work on sniffing Bitlocker encryption keys, I asked a coworker if we could sniff the TPM traffic during boot. The TPM on the board in question uses SPI, a simple bus that can have multiple devices connected to it. In this case the system flash and the TPM are on the same SPI bus, which made things easier. The board had a flash header for external reprogramming of the firmware in the event of failure, and all SPI traffic was visible through that header. Attaching a logic analyser to this header made it simple to generate a record of that. The only problem was that the chip select line on the header was attached to the firmware flash chip, not the TPM. This was worked around by simply telling the analysis software that it should invert the sense of the chip select line, ignoring all traffic that was bound for the flash and paying attention to all other traffic. This worked in this case since the only other device on the bus was the TPM, but would cause problems in the event of multiple devices on the bus all communicating.

With the aid of this analyser plugin, I was able to dump all the TPM traffic and could then search for writes that included the "0182" sequence that corresponds to the command code for a measurement event. This gave me a couple of accesses to the locality 3 registers, which was a strong indication that they were coming from the CPU rather than from the firmware. One was for PCR 0, and one was for PCR 7. This corresponded to the two Boot Guard events that we expected from the event log. The hash in the PCR 0 measurement was the same as the hash in the event log, but the hash in the PCR 7 measurement differed from the hash in the event log. Replacing the event log value with the value actually sent to the TPM resulted in the event log now replaying correctly, supporting the hypothesis that the firmware was failing to correctly reconstruct the event.

What now? The simple thing to do is for us to simply hard code this fixup, but longer term we'd like to figure out how to reconstruct the event so we can calculate the expected value ourselves. Unfortunately there doesn't seem to be any public documentation on this. Sigh.

[1] What stops firmware on a system with no Boot Guard faking those measurements? TPMs have a concept of "localities", effectively different privilege levels. When Boot Guard performs its initial measurement into PCR 0, it does so at locality 3, a locality that's only available to the CPU. This causes PCR 0 to be initialised to a different initial value, affecting the final PCR value. The firmware can't access locality 3, so can't perform an equivalent measurement, so can't fake the value.

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Two years ago, I wrote Managing an External Display on Linux Shouldn t Be This Hard. Happily, since I wrote that post, most of those issues have been resolved. But then you throw HiDPI into the mix and it all goes wonky. If you re running X11, basically the story is that you can change the scale factor, but it only takes effect on newly-launched applications (which means a logout/in because some of your applications you can t really re-launch). That is a problem if, like me, you sometimes connect an external display that is HiDPI, sometimes not, or your internal display is HiDPI but others aren t. Wayland is far better, supporting on-the-fly resizes quite nicely. I ve had two devices with HiDPI displays: a Surface Go 2, and a work-issued Thinkpad. The Surface Go 2 is my ultraportable Linux tablet. I use it sparingly at home, and rarely with an external display. I just put Gnome on it, in part because Gnome had better on-screen keyboard support at the time, and left it at that. On the work-issued Thinkpad, I really wanted to run KDE thanks to its tiling support (I wound up using bismuth with it). KDE was buggy with Wayland at the time, so I just stuck with X11 and ran my HiDPI displays at lower resolutions and lived with the fuzziness. But now that I have a Framework laptop with a HiDPI screen, I wanted to get this right. I tried both Gnome and KDE. Here are my observations with both: Gnome I used PaperWM with Gnome. PaperWM is a tiling manager with a unique horizontal ribbon approach. It grew on me; I think I would be equally at home, or maybe even prefer it, to my usual xmonad-style approach. Editing the active window border color required editing ~/.local/share/gnome-shell/extensions/paperwm@hedning:matrix.org/stylesheet.css and inserting background-color and border-color items in the paperwm-selection section. Gnome continues to have an absolutely terrible picture for configuring things. It has no less than four places to make changes (Settings, Tweaks, Extensions, and dconf-editor). In many cases, configuration for a given thing is split between Settings and Tweaks, and sometimes even with Extensions, and then there are sometimes options that are only visible in dconf. That is, where the Gnome people have even allowed something to be configurable. Gnome installs a power manager by default. It offers three options: performance, balanced, and saver. There is no explanation of the difference between them. None. What is it setting when I change the pref? A maximum frequency? A scaling governor? A balance between performance and efficiency cores? Not only that, but there s no way to tell it to just use performance when plugged in and balanced or saver when on battery. In an issue about adding that, a Gnome dev wrote We re not going to add a preference just because you want one . KDE, on the other hand, aside from not mucking with your system s power settings in this way, has a nice panel with on AC and on battery and you can very easily tweak various settings accordingly. The hostile attitude from the Gnome developers in that thread was a real turnoff. While Gnome has excellent support for Wayland, it doesn t (directly) support fractional scaling. That is, you can set it to 100%, 200%, and so forth, but no 150%. Well, unless you manage to discover that you can run gsettings set org.gnome.mutter experimental-features "['scale-monitor-framebuffer']" first. (Oh wait, does that make a FIFTH settings tool? Why yes it does.) Despite its name, that allows you to select fractional scaling under Wayland. For X11 apps, they will be blurry, a problem that is optional under KDE (more on that below). Gnome won t show the battery life time remaining on the task bar. Yikes. An extension might work in some cases. Not only that, but the Gnome battery icon frequently failed to indicate AC charging when AC was connected, a problem that didn t exist on KDE. Both Gnome and KDE support night light (warmer color temperatures at night), but Gnome s often didn t change when it should have, or changed on one display but not the other. The appindicator extension is pretty much required, as otherwise a number of applications (eg, Nextcloud) don t have their icon display anywhere. It does, however, generate a significant amount of log spam. There may be a fix for this. Unlike KDE, which has a nice inobtrusive popup asking what to do, Gnome silently automounts USB sticks when inserted. This is often wrong; for instance, if I m about to dd a Debian installer to it, I definitely don t want it mounted. I learned this the hard way. It is particularly annoying because in a GUI, there is no reason to mount a drive before the user tries to access it anyhow. It looks like there is a dconf setting, but then to actually mount a drive you have to open up Files (because OF COURSE Gnome doesn t have a nice removable-drives icon like KDE does) and it s a bunch of annoying clicks, and I didn t want to use the GUI file manager anyway. Same for unmounting; two clicks in KDE thanks to the task bar icon, but in Gnome you have to open up the file manager, unmount the drive, close the file manager again, etc. The ssh agent on Gnome doesn t start up for a Wayland session, though this is easily enough worked around. The reason I completely soured on Gnome is that after using it for awhile, I noticed my laptop fans spinning up. One core would be constantly busy. It was busy with a kworker events task, something to do with sound events. Logging out would resolve it. I believe it to be a Gnome shell issue. I could find no resolution to this, and am unwilling to tolerate the decreased battery life this implies. The Gnome summary: it looks nice out of the box, but you quickly realize that this is something of a paper-thin illusion when you try to actually use it regularly. KDE The KDE experience on Wayland was a little bit opposite of Gnome. While with Gnome, things start out looking great but you realize there are some serious issues (especially battery-eating), with KDE things start out looking a tad rough but you realize you can trivially fix them and wind up with a very solid system. Compared to Gnome, KDE never had a battery-draining problem. It will show me estimated battery time remaining if I want it to. It will do whatever I want it to when I insert a USB drive. It doesn t muck with my CPU power settings, and lets me easily define on AC vs on battery settings for things like suspend when idle. KDE supports fractional scaling, to any arbitrary setting (even with the gsettings thing above, Gnome still only supports it in 25% increments). Then the question is what to do with X11-only applications. KDE offers two choices. The first is Scaled by the system , which is also the only option for Gnome. With that setting, the X11 apps effectively run natively at 100% and then are scaled up within Wayland, giving them a blurry appearance on HiDPI displays. The advantage is that the scaling happens within Wayland, so the size of the app will always be correct even when the Wayland scaling factor changes. The other option is Apply scaling themselves , which uses native X11 scaling. This lets most X11 apps display crisp and sharp, but then if the system scaling changes, due to limitations of X11, you ll have to restart the X apps to get them to be the correct size. I appreciate the choice, and use Apply scaling by themselves because only a few of my apps aren t Wayland-aware. I did encounter a few bugs in KDE under Wayland: sddm, the display manager, would be slow to stop and cause a long delay on shutdown or reboot. This seems to be a known issue with sddm and Wayland, and is easily worked around by adding a systemd TimeoutStopSec. Konsole, the KDE terminal emulator, has weird display artifacts when using fractional scaling under Wayland. I applied some patches and rebuilt Konsole and then all was fine. The Bismuth tiling extension has some pretty weird behavior under Wayland, but a 1-character patch fixes it. On Debian, KDE mysteriously installed Pulseaudio instead of Debian s new default Pipewire, but that was easily fixed as well (and Pulseaudio also works fine). Conclusions I m sticking with KDE. Given that I couldn t figure out how to stop Gnome from deciding to eat enough battery to make my fan come on, the decision wasn t hard. But even if it weren t for that, I d have gone with KDE. Once a couple of things were patched, the experience is solid, fast, and flawless. Emacs (my main X11-only application) looks great with the self-scaling in KDE. Gimp, which I use occasionally, was terrible with the blurry scaling in Gnome. Update: Corrected the gsettings command

Armadillo is a powerful and expressive C++ template library for linear algebra and scientific computing. It aims towards a good balance between speed and ease of use, has a syntax deliberately close to Matlab, and is useful for algorithm development directly in C++, or quick conversion of research code into production environments. RcppArmadillo integrates this library with the R environment and language and is widely used by (currently) 1096 other packages on CRAN, downloaded 30.5 million times (per the partial logs from the cloud mirrors of CRAN), and the CSDA paper (preprint / vignette) by Conrad and myself has been cited 552 times according to Google Scholar. This release brings bugfix upstream release 12.6.4. Conrad prepared this a few days ago; it takes me the usual day or so to run reverse-dependency check against the by-now almost 1100 CRAN packages using RcppArmadillo. And this time, CRAN thought it had found two issues when I submitted and it took two more days til we were all clear about those two being false positives (as can, and does, happen). So today it reached CRAN. The set of changes follows.

Changes in RcppArmadillo version 0.12.6.4.0 (2023-09-06)

• Upgraded to Armadillo release 12.6.4 (Cortisol Retox)
  • Workarounds for bugs in Apple accelerate framework
  • Fix incorrect calculation of rcond for band matrices in solve()
  • Remove expensive and seldom used optimisations, leading to faster compilation times

Courtesy of my CRANberries, there is a diffstat report relative to previous release. More detailed information is on the RcppArmadillo page. Questions, comments etc should go to the rcpp-devel mailing list off the Rcpp R-Forge page. If you like this or other open-source work I do, you can sponsor me at GitHub.

This post by Dirk Eddelbuettel originated on his Thinking inside the box blog. Please report excessive re-aggregation in third-party for-profit settings.